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THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT TO RECORD
IMAGES OF POLICE IN PUBLIC PLACES:
THE UNREASONABLE SLIPPERINESS
OF REASONABLENESS & POSSIBLE
PATHS FORWARD
By: Clay Calvert*
ABSTRACT
Analyzing federal cases through May 2015, this Article examines the cur-
rent, contested terrain of the emerging, yet qualified, First Amendment right to
record police performing duties in public venues. The Article argues that mul-
tiple First Amendment interests, ranging from the watchdog role of the press
to discovery of truth under the marketplace of ideas theory, mandate that the
reasonable-restrictions standard, which is now deployed by most courts to de-
cide if this nascent right may permissibly be abridged, be jettisoned in favor of
a more rigorous, speech-friendly approach. Specifically, the Article advocates
a form of judicial review akin to strict scrutiny. It also proposes a framework
of analysis—a “Continuum of Necessity”—for adding consistency and teeth
to this tack. The Article concludes by calling on the Supreme Court to quickly
consider a right-to-record case to establish two key points: (1) the existence of
a clearly established First Amendment right in 2015 to record police perform-
ing their duties in public places; and (2) any restrictions imposed on this right
are permissible only if they are so narrowly tailored that no viable alternatives
exist that would allow for greater ability to record police under the
circumstances.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Feidin Santana is not, by either trade or training, a journalist. He is,
in fact, a twenty-three-year-old barber.1 Yet, in early April 2015, the
native of the Dominican Republic2 performed an unexpected but vital
journalistic function3 while walking to work one morning in North
1. David Zurawik, Nonjournalists Again Leading the Discussion, BALT. SUN,
Apr. 12, 2015, at 1E.
2. See Feidin Santana, Who Recorded Police Shooting of Walter Scott, Speaks
Out, NBC NEWS (Apr. 8, 2015, 11:21 PM ET), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/
feidin-santana-who-recorded-man-shot-police-officer-speaks-out-n338171 (noting
that Santana “immigrated to the U.S. from the Dominican Republic”).
3. Santana’s recording of the Walter Scott shooting embodies performance of the
watchdog function of journalism, as it directly exposed abuses of power by a govern-
ment official—namely, a police officer. See generally W. Lance Bennett & William
Serrin, The Watchdog Role, in THE PRESS 169, 169 (Geneva Overholser & Kathleen
Hall Jamieson eds., 2005) (asserting that “the watchdog role of journalism may in-
volve simply documenting the activities of government, business, and other public
institutions in ways that expose little-publicized or hidden activities to public
scrutiny”).
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Charleston, South Carolina.4 Using a smartphone, Santana captured a
video that would repeatedly air on newscasts and impart “the kind of
information that drives national conversations.”5
It depicts a white police officer named Michael T. Slager fatally
shooting Walter L. Scott, an unarmed black man, multiple times in the
back after Slager pulled Scott over for a broken taillight.6 Santana’s
video, as the Wall Street Journal reported, led to murder charges
against Slager “and became the latest flash point in the debate about
race and policing in America.”7 Indeed, another newspaper pointed
out that “[i]f not for a chilling cellphone video, the shooting of Walter
Scott in North Charleston might have been written off as a justified
police shooting, another case of an officer gunning down a man be-
cause he feared for his life.”8
Put more bluntly, the video spoke the truth for a dead man who
could not. In doing so, it also provided a path for possible posthumous
justice.
Critically, Feidin Santana took the video despite a second police of-
ficer telling him to stop.9 Furthermore, that officer ordered Santana to
stay put, but, as Santana told MSNBC, he “realized that that would be
something no good and so I just run to my job.”10 Whether that officer
would have seized Santana’s phone and deleted the video, of course, is
conjecture.
What is clear, however, is that both the public and criminal justice
system benefited immensely from Santana’s video, which directly con-
tradicted Slager’s official version of events.11 In fact, the day before
4. See Transcript: Morning Joe Exclusive with Feidin Santana, MSNBC (Apr. 9,
2015, 9:10 AM), http://www.msnbc.com/morning-joe/transcript-morning-joe-exclusive
-feidin-santana [http://perma.cc/QK42-K2YJ] [hereinafter Morning Joe Exclusive with
Feidin Santana] (quoting Santana for the proposition that “I live close to the scene. I
used to live close from there. And I was heading to my work, to my job. I’m a barber
and I work in a barbershop near there, so it’s easy for me to just go and walk”).
5. Zurawik, supra note 1, at 1E.
6. Frances Robles & Alan Blinder, A Stark Image of a Shooting Carries Impact,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2015, at A1; see also David Zucchino, Anger Simmers at S.C.
Funeral, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2015, at A8 (noting that Scott “was driving a used Mer-
cedes-Benz to buy auto parts when Slager pulled him over in the parking lot of an
Advance Auto Store in North Charleston”).
7. Valerie Bauerlein, How Shooting was Caught on Video, WALL ST. J., Apr. 10,
2015, at A4; see also Ernie Suggs, Police Shooting - ‘We Didn’t Want Another Fergu-
son’ - South Carolina City Straddles Delicate Line in Shooting’s Aftermath, ATLANTA
J.-CONST., Apr. 12, 2015, at A1 (noting that “Santana’s video directly led to Slager’s
arrest”).
8. S.C. Shooting Video Could Have Impact, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH (Va.),
Apr. 9, 2015, at 1A.
9. Steve Almasy, Feidin Santana on S.C. Shooting: I Told Them What They Did
Was an Abuse, CNN (Apr. 13, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/04/09/us/south-caro
lina-witness-video/ [http://perma.cc/2FM4-WKX5].
10. Morning Joe Exclusive with Feidin Santana, supra note 4.
11. See Michael S. Schmidt & Matt Apuzzo, Once Again, a Shooting Brings Race
to the Fore, INT’L N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2015, at 6 (reporting that “Officer Slager had
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Santana’s video surfaced, Slager claimed he feared for his life when he
fired at least eight shots at Scott.12 Santana’s video, however, “in-
stantly demolished the official version.”13 Indeed, its disclosure
marked the pivotal turning point in the case, with Slager being imme-
diately fired thereafter and now facing a possible life sentence or the
death penalty if convicted.14 The video remains posted today on The
New York Times’s website.15
Unfortunately, many people like Santana and Ramsey Orta—the
latter captured a video depicting a chokehold placed on Eric Garner
by a New York City police officer in July 2014 that caused Garner’s
death16—are not so lucky today when they try to film police perform-
ing duties in public places. Consider, for example, the following dis-
turbing incidents, all occurring in April 2015—the same month of the
North Charleston shooting.
A police officer in New Jersey City, New Jersey, stopped and de-
tained a man named Joe Feranti who was filming a traffic stop with his
phone.17 Feranti was standing on a public sidewalk when the officer
told him “if you are recording my stop then I have to seize your
said he feared for his life because Mr. Scott had taken his stun gun in the scuffle. But
. . . the video . . . seemed to dispel ambiguity over what took place. After it surfaced,
Officer Slager was charged with murder”); David Zucchino et al., Video Set One Fatal
Police Shooting Apart, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2015, at A1, A10 (quoting Justin Bamberg,
an attorney representing the family of the slain Walter Scott, for the proposition that
“[t]he officer lied in his incident report and his lies were corroborated by the Police
Department. . . . It wasn’t until the video came out that all that changed completely”).
12. James Queally & David Zucchino, S. Carolina Officer Charged with Murder,
L.A. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2015, at A7.
13. Juan Gonzalez, When Will the Killing Cease?, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Apr. 10,
2015, at 6.
14. Mark Berman et al., S.C. Officer Charged in Black Man’s Killing, WASH. POST,
Apr. 8, 2015, at A1, A10.
15. Video Shows Fatal Police Shooting, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2015), http://
www.nytimes.com/video/us/100000003615939/video-shows-fatal-police-shooting.html.
16. See Susan Page, 7 Stories That Matter for 2015, USA TODAY, Dec. 31, 2014, at
1A, 5A (providing a brief description of the incident Ramsey caught on his cellphone
camera); Jake Pearson, NYPD Officer’s Chokehold Blamed in Man’s Death, WASH.
POST, Aug. 2, 2014, at A2 (reporting that the New York City medical examiner con-
cluded “that a police officer’s chokehold caused the death of a man whose videotaped
arrest and alleged final pleas of ‘I can’t breathe!’ sparked outrage and led to the an-
nouncement of an overhaul of use-of-force training for the nation’s largest police
force. The death was ruled a homicide”); Ashley Southall & Marc Santora, At Fu-
neral, Rallying Cry for a Symbol of a Divide, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2014, at A23 (re-
porting that Ramsey’s video shows Officer Daniel Pantaleo “wrapping his arm around
the neck of Mr. Garner, who was on a Staten Island street corner, arguing with the
police and objecting to being arrested. The department has banned the use of
chokeholds since 1993”).
17. Christie Duffy, Man Claims He Was Illegally Detained for Filming Jersey City
Police, PIX 11 NEWS (Apr. 28, 2015), http://pix11.com/2015/04/28/man-claims-he-was-
illegally-detained-for-filming-jersey-city-police/ [http://perma.cc/V236-WFKZ]. Fer-
anti’s video of the incident is posted on YouTube. Joe Feranti, Being Illegally Detained
by Jersey City Police, YOUTUBE (Apr. 25, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=c4yB04UdWX8 (last visited July 18, 2015).
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phone.”18 Also in the Garden State, police in Paterson confiscated the
camera of a newspaper photographer, who was lawfully standing be-
hind crime-scene tape, “after he refused to delete several photographs
taken at the scene of the city’s seventh homicide this year.”19
Across the country, a video from California appeared in April 2015
on YouTube that seems “to show a Santa Barbara police officer
knocking a cell phone out of the hands of a bystander filming a down-
town arrest.”20 Also in the Golden State, and perhaps most egre-
giously of all the incidents from April 2015:
[A] deputy U.S. Marshal was caught on video snatching a woman’s
phone and smashing it on the ground.
The woman was using the phone to film armed deputies in Los
Angeles County when one of the men suddenly rushed her, the 53-
second recording revealed.
The burly, bearded deputy tore the phone from the woman’s
hands and slammed it on the ground as she tried to scramble away.
“No! Don’t do that!,” the woman screamed.
The unidentified deputy, dressed in a tactical vest and carrying a
rifle, appeared to kick something across the ground before he and
the others turned and walked off.
The shocking encounter was captured by a stunned witness who
was filming from across the street.21
The bottom line is that while this may well be the era of “video
democracy,”22 filming police officers in public places remains risky
and sometimes leads to detention and/or arrest.23 It is also an activity
18. Duffy, supra note 17.
19. Peter J. Sampson & Jim Norman, Cops Seize Camera of Record Staffer, HER-
ALD NEWS (N.J.), Apr. 30, 2015, at B2.
20. Tyler Haden, Video of Arrest Appears to Show Officer Knock Phone from By-
stander’s Hands, SANTA BARBARA INDEP. (Cal.) (Apr. 23, 2015), http://www.indepen
dent.com/news/2015/apr/23/video-arrest-appears-show-officer-knock-phone-byst/
[http://perma.cc/S3Q8-69RH]. The video of the incident is posted on YouTube. Man
Assaulted by Santa Barbara Police Officer, YOUTUBE (Apr. 22, 2015), https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=MNdMQIcTzzw (last visited July 18, 2015).
21. Doyle Murphy, U.S. Marshals Investigate Deputy Filmed Smashing Woman’s
Phone in California, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Apr. 21, 2015), http://www.nydailynews.com/
news/national/u-s-marshal-deputy-filmed-smashing-watcher-phone-article-1.2193664.
The video in question is posted on YouTube. U.S. Marshals in South Gate Attack Cop
Watcher. Destroys Her Cellphone, YOUTUBE (Apr. 19, 2015), https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=O-J-6SkuKJ0&app=desktop (last visited June 18, 2015).
22. David Zurawik, Catching up with Video Democracy, BALT. SUN, Dec. 7, 2014,
at 1E.
23. See, e.g., Danny Jacobs, Woman Charged After Taking Video of Arrest Sues
Baltimore Police, DAILY REC. (Balt., Md.), Mar. 12, 2015, LexisNexis Academic (re-
porting that “[a] Baltimore woman has sued police after she was allegedly assaulted
and arrested for filming an officer drawing her gun and arresting people in a shopping
center parking lot”); Eliot Kleinberg, Video of City Cops May Lead to Lawsuit, PALM
BEACH POST (Fla.), Mar. 6, 2014, at 1B (reporting that William Avery Chatman was
arrested and had his cellphone seized because he was “taking video of West Palm
Beach police officers who’d detained a man”); Lou Michel, Police Say Cop Made
Threat to Take Phone; Effort Cited to Delete Video After Beating, BUFFALO NEWS
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likely to increase in the near future, as smartphone applications (or
“apps”) such as “Cop Watch” facilitate and expedite the recording
and posting of videos online.24
Additionally, the issue carries fiscal significance. That is because,
when police wrongfully arrest citizens for recording them, it some-
times proves expensive for taxpayers. A whopping $250,000 settle-
ment paid by the City of Baltimore in 2014 demonstrates this fact.25
Ultimately then, as Mickey Osterreicher, general counsel for the Na-
(N.Y.), May 1, 2014, at B11 (reporting that “Buffalo Police Officer John A. Cirulli
threatened to confiscate the cellphone of the man who made a video of the officer
beating John T. Willet unless he deleted the recording,” and adding that “[t]he video
is the key piece of evidence in an investigation by the Internal Affairs Division of the
Police Department. The FBI also is looking into the incident because of concerns
about possible civil rights violations”); Greg Sowinski, Filming Police Causes Stir -
Man Faces Charges After Refusing to Turn Over Video, DAYTON DAILY NEWS
(Ohio), May 12, 2014, at B8 (reporting that “[a] man using a smartphone to record
video of a police traffic stop is facing criminal charges after he refused to turn over his
phone”).
24. See Farhad Manjoo & Mike Isaac, Right Time, Right Place, Right App for Cap-
turing Interactions with Police, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2015, at A17 (describing Cop
Watch as “an iPhone app that automatically begins recording when you tap its icon
and automatically uploads the video to YouTube when the recording is stopped”). In
addition to Cop Watch, the ACLU of Northern California in April 2015 introduced
the “Mobile Justice CA” app, which allows one “to send video to the ACLU even if
law enforcement officials try to confiscate or destroy your smartphone.” Press Re-
lease, Mitra Ebadolahi, Am. Civil Liberties Union of N. Cal., New ACLU Mobile
Justice App Empowers Public to Safeguard Rights (Apr. 30, 2015), https://
www.aclunc.org/blog/new-aclu-mobile-justice-app-empowers-public-safeguard-rights.
25. Settlement Agreement and Release, Sharp v. Balt. City Police Dep’t, No. 1:11-
cv-02888-CCB (D. Md. Jan. 28, 2014), http://www.aclu-md.org/uploaded_files/0000/
0486/sharp_v._bpd_final_signed_agreement.pdf [http://perma.cc/3NUL-W2K8]; see
Danny Jacobs, City of Baltimore to Pay $250K in Preakness Arrest Video Suit, DAILY
REC. (Balt., Md.), Mar. 4, 2014, LexisNexis Academic (reporting that Baltimore was
“set to approve a $250,000 settlement with an Owings Mills man who alleged police
seized his cellphone and deleted video he took of his friend being arrested during the
2010 Preakness Stakes. Christopher Sharp claimed police also deleted videos of his
son and reset his phone”).
In 2014, the City of Orlando, Florida, paid $15,000 to settle a lawsuit filed by Al-
berto Troche, who alleged he “was jailed and had a cell phone pulled from his hand by
a police officer because he video-recorded officers arresting another man who was
calling for help.” Rene Stutzman, Orlando Pays $15K to Man Jailed for Recording
Cops, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Dec. 27, 2014, at B1.
In March 2015, the American Civil Liberties Union of Maine reached a settlement
for an undisclosed amount of attorney fees and cash on behalf of plaintiffs Jill Walker
and Sabatino Scattoloni, who:
were visiting Portland [Maine] on May 25, 2014 when they observed an en-
counter between five police officers and one woman. Walker and Scattoloni
decided to film the incident from across the street, and they subsequently
moved closer to observe the police activities. Officer [Benjamin] Noyes or-
dered the two to get off the sidewalk or face arrest. When Walker and Scat-
toloni asked the reason they would be arrested, Officer Noyes immediately
ordered two other officers to arrest the couple.
Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union of Me., ACLU, Portland Police Reach Set-
tlement in Filming Case (Mar. 30, 2015), http://www.aclumaine.org/aclu-portland-po-
lice-reach-settlement-filming-case.
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tional Press Photographers Association, puts it, “[i]t’s the perfect
storm . . . . You’ve got everyone with phone technology capable of
recording high-quality stills and videos, along with the capacity of
uploading these images immediately on YouTube.”26
This Article treads into the eye of that storm. It explores the emerg-
ing contours and contested terrain of the First Amendment27 right of
citizens to record images of law enforcement personnel carrying out
their duties in public venues. It is an issue the Supreme Court, unfor-
tunately, has not squarely addressed,28 but that multiple lower courts
considered in 2014 and 2015.29
Part II of this Article comprehensively examines recent judicial de-
cisions—through and including May 2015—affecting this nascent
right.30 In the process, it also critiques the reasonableness standard
adopted by many courts today as the legal benchmark against which
police restrictions on this qualified constitutional right are measured.
Additionally, it explores how the reasonable-restrictions approach
mirrors the standard embraced by the Supreme Court in evaluating
police actions in Fourth Amendment31 cases.
Next, Part III argues that the reasonableness standard embraced by
courts for restricting the right to record police is too lax, at least from
a free-speech perspective, because it only accounts for Fourth Amend-
ment interests in ensuring proper law enforcement encounters during
26. Billy Cox, Recording Police, and Catching Some Flak, SARASOTA HERALD
TRIB. (Fla.), Mar. 11, 2014, at A1.
27. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent
part, that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press.” U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Free Speech and Free Press Clauses were incorpo-
rated ninety years ago through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause as
fundamental liberties to apply to state and local government entities and officials. See
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
28. See Mocek v. City of Albuquerque, 3 F. Supp. 3d 1002, 1057 (D.N.M. 2014)
(writing that “[n]either the Tenth Circuit nor the Supreme Court has directly ad-
dressed a right—constitutional or otherwise—to record police or law enforcement
activity in public” (emphasis added)).
29. See cases discussed infra Part II, Section B.
30. See infra notes 37–231 and accompanying text.
31. The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or af-
firmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the per-
sons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment has been incorporated through the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause to apply to state and local government
entities and officials. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949) (observing that “we
have no hesitation in saying that were a State affirmatively to sanction such police
incursion into privacy it would run counter to the guaranty of the Fourth Amend-
ment”); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (holding, with regard to the exclu-
sionary rule adopted in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1924), that “all evidence
obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same
authority, inadmissible in a state court”).
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stops and arrests.32 In doing so, it fails to give proper weight to com-
peting First Amendment speech and press interests in newsgathering,
the watchdog function of the press now often played by citizen-jour-
nalists, and, perhaps most importantly, the goal of truth discovery,
which lies at the heart of the marketplace of ideas theory that under-
lies much of modern First Amendment jurisprudence.33
Part IV then proposes that police must prove that any restrictions
imposed on the qualified First Amendment right to record them per-
forming duties in public places are not simply reasonable, but that
they are, in fact, necessary and narrowly tailored to serve directly a
compelling interest in officer, detainee/suspect, or public safety.34 This
is in accord with the strict scrutiny standard of judicial review35 that
typically must be satisfied by governmental entities to justify a con-
tent-based restriction on speech. Additionally, Part IV goes further to
recommend—for future academic, law enforcement, and judicial dis-
cussion—eight variables for consideration in determining when a re-
cording restriction is not simply reasonable, but narrowly tailored.
Finally, the Article concludes in Part V by urging the Supreme
Court to grant certiorari in a right-to-record case in order to recognize
a First Amendment right to capture images of police doing their jobs
in public venues and, in turn, to impose a heightened standard—one
greater than mere reasonableness and one that accounts for First
Amendment concerns—for analyzing when this qualified right may
permissibly be curtailed.36
32. See infra notes 232–83 and accompanying text.
33. Justice Anthony Kennedy reaffirmed this maxim and the power of the market-
place metaphor in United States v. Alvarez, writing for the plurality that “[t]he theory
of our Constitution is ‘that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get
itself accepted in the competition of the market.’” United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct.
2537, 2550 (2012) (quoting Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919)
(Holmes, J., dissenting)).
34. See infra notes 285–307 and accompanying text.
35. See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011) (asserting
that because a California law limiting minors’ access to violent video games “imposes
a restriction on the content of protected speech, it is invalid unless California can
demonstrate that it passes strict scrutiny—that is, unless it is justified by a compelling
government interest and is narrowly drawn to serve that interest”); United States v.
Playboy Entm’t Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (asserting that a content-based speech
restriction can only withstand judicial review “if it satisfies strict scrutiny,” opining
that “[i]f a statute regulates speech based on its content, it must be narrowly tailored
to promote a compelling Government interest,” and adding that “[i]f a less restrictive
alternative would serve the Government’s purpose, the legislature must use that
alternative”).
36. See infra notes 308–11 and accompanying text.
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II. JUDICIAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE RIGHT TO RECORD POLICE:
BUMPS AND DETOURS ON THE ROAD TO RECOGNIZING A
QUALIFIED FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT
On initial glance, establishing a First Amendment right to record
images of police officers doing their jobs in public places would seem
to be a fairly easy constitutional task—one flowing naturally from a
number of established principles and maxims. Specifically, the logic
chain for recognizing the right goes something along the lines of what
follows below.
First, the Supreme Court has long held that images and films, not
merely spoken and written words,37 are protected by the First Amend-
ment.38 Second, and more recently, the nation’s high court concluded
that the act of creating such images—not merely the finished prod-
uct—also is safeguarded by that amendment.39 Third, courts are clear
that a person generally does not possess a reasonable expectation of
privacy when he or she is situated in a public place, such as a street or
sidewalk.40 Fourth, and in accord with the first three points, the Su-
preme Court has observed that public streets and sidewalks—places
where police often carry out their work—“are areas that have histori-
cally been open to the public for speech activities.”41 Fifth and finally,
the conduct of police, as government officials, is a matter of public
concern, and speech regarding matters of public concern is, as the Su-
37. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557,
569 (1995) (observing that “the Constitution looks beyond written or spoken words as
mediums of expression”).
38. See Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 119–20 (1973); see also Joseph Burstyn,
Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952) (concluding that “expression by means of
motion pictures is included within the free speech and free press guaranty of the First
and Fourteenth Amendments”).
39. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2734 n.1 (noting that, for First Amendment purposes,
“[w]hether government regulation applies to creating, distributing, or consuming
speech makes no difference”); see also Ashutosh Bhagwat, Producing Speech, 56 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1029, 1080 (2015) (concluding, after an exhaustive analysis, that the
First Amendment “protects the creation of communicative materials—in other words,
producing speech”).
40. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (reasoning that
“[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is
not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection”); Vega-Rodriguez v. P.R. Tel. Co.,
110 F.3d 174, 181 (1st Cir. 1997) (observing that “persons cannot reasonably maintain
an expectation of privacy in that which they display openly”); Wishart v. McDonald,
500 F.2d 1110, 1113–14 (1st Cir. 1974) (asserting that “the right to privacy . . . may be
surrendered by public display. The right to be left alone in the home extends only to
the home and not to conduct displayed under the street lamp on the front lawn”);
Jackson v. Playboy Enters., Inc., 574 F. Supp. 10, 13 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (finding no
expectation of privacy in a tort case where the plaintiffs “were on a city sidewalk in
plain view of the public eye”); Stern v. Doe, 806 So. 2d 98, 102 (La. Ct. App. 2001)
(observing that “no right to privacy attaches to material in the public view” and not-
ing that “[t]he plaintiff was clearly in the public view when he was standing on the
sidewalk across the street from the school”).
41. McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2529 (2014).
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preme Court recently reiterated in Snyder v. Phelps,42 at the heart of
the First Amendment.43
It thus seems like a legal no-brainer, as it were, that citizens possess
a First Amendment right to take pictures, videos, and audio record-
ings of police performing their jobs in public venues. Unfortunately, it
is not nearly that simple or clear.
Despite the series of legal principles identified two paragraphs
above, current case law regarding the right to film police working in
public places provides a mixed bag of good and bad news for citizen-
journalists44 and, more broadly, for the public’s unenumerated right to
know and to receive information.45 As described below, although four
federal appellate circuits now recognize a First Amendment right to
film police doing their jobs in public places, that right is qualified
rather than absolute. In turn, the “reasonableness” standard for deter-
mining when the right may permissibly be abridged by police provides
far too much discretion for a few nefarious members of law enforce-
ment to misuse and abuse it. Furthermore, some federal circuits have
rejected the very existence of a clearly established First Amendment
right to record police, be it qualified or absolute. Still other federal
42. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011).
43. Id. at 451–52.
44. See D. Jasun Carr et al., Cynics and Skeptics: Evaluating the Credibility of
Mainstream and Citizen Journalism, 91 JOURNALISM & MASS COMM. Q. 452, 453–54
(2014), http://jmq.sagepub.com/content/early/2014/06/13/1077699014538828 (defining
citizen journalism broadly as “amateur news reporting” and, conversely, narrowly as
“the reporting of newsworthy events, usually disasters or crises (events that the main-
stream media cannot predict), typically using new media technologies, and often
before the mainstream media arrive on the scene”); Sue Robinson & Cathy Deshano,
Citizen Journalists and the Third Places: What Makes People Exchange Information
Online (or Not)?, 12 JOURNALISM STUD. 642, 643 (2011), http://www.tandfonline.com/
doi/abs/10.1080/1461670X.2011.557559 (asserting that the notion of citizen journalism
“embodies the grassroots self-publishing of content that creates and extends conver-
sation by citizens who were once part of the audience but are now ‘produsers’ without
institutional backing,” and adding that “the label is used pervasively to describe eve-
ryone from bloggers to those who merely contribute to news forums”).
45. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (finding that “[t]he right
of freedom of speech and press includes not only the right to utter or to print, but the
right to distribute, the right to receive, the right to read” (emphasis added)); see also
LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE FOURTH ESTATE AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREEDOM OF
THE PRESS IN AMERICA 242 (1991) (“Although often tied specifically into demands
for freedom of information statutes and open meeting laws, the right to know gained
a momentum of its own and was, by the end of the 1960s, treated by the media as a
synonym for freedom of the press.”); Eric B. Easton, Public Importance: Balancing
Proprietary Interests and the Right to Know, 21 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 139,
141–42 (2003) (observing that “[f]ew of the corollary principles that grow out of the
First Amendment have inspired more thoughtful scholarship and impassioned debate
than the notion that an implicit right to know accompanies the explicit right to
speak”); Barbara H. Smith, The First Amendment Right to Receive Online Informa-
tion in Public Libraries, 18 COMM. L. & POL’Y 63, 63–64 (2013), http://
www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10811680.2013.746139 (asserting that “[t]he
First Amendment right of free speech has a corollary right,” namely “the right to
receive information and ideas”).
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circuits have yet to address the issue, though some district courts
within those same circuits have recently considered it. The sum total is
a maddening morass of murkiness that negatively affects the public’s
right to know while sometimes providing the cloak of qualified immu-
nity for police to avoid monetary liability.
A. The State of the Law in 2015: Split of Authority or Emerging
Robust Consensus?
In March 2015, U.S. District Judge Vanessa Bryant of Connecticut,
which falls within the Second Circuit, found a split of authority among
the federal circuits when it comes to recording police.46 She observed
in Rivera v. Foley47 that “[t]he First Circuit, Seventh Circuit, Eleventh
Circuit, and Ninth Circuit all recognize that the First Amendment pro-
tects the photography and recording of police officers engaged in their
official duties. The Third Circuit and the Fourth Circuit take the con-
trary approach.”48 Judge Bryant, in turn, concluded that as of Febru-
ary 2014—the date of the incident at issue in the case before her—
“the right to photograph and record police officers who are engaged
in an ongoing investigation was not clearly established as a matter of
constitutional law in [the Second] Circuit.”49
Yet, just one month prior, in February 2015, U.S. Magistrate Mark
Lane of Texas, which is situated in the Fifth Circuit, recognized a “ro-
bust consensus among circuit courts of appeals”50 that “the right to
photograph and videotape police officers as they perform their official
duties [is] clearly established.”51 Lane went on to opine that “[t]he
First Amendment protects a private citizen’s right to assemble in a
public forum, receive information on a matter of public concern—
such as police officers performing their official duties—and to record
that information for the purpose of conveying that information.”52
The fact that two federal district courts, within the span of only one
month, reached seemingly opposite conclusions on the same issue—
split of authority versus robust consensus—illustrates judicial discord
in 2015 regarding the right to record law enforcement personnel doing
their jobs. To begin to unpack this muddle, Section B examines deci-
sions by federal circuit courts that have yet to recognize a clearly es-
tablished First Amendment right to record police, as well as recent
decisions by district courts within those same appellate circuits that
have addressed the issue. In contrast, Section C analyzes cases from
46. Rivera v. Foley, No. 3:14-cv-00196 (VLB), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35639, at *24
(D. Conn. Mar. 23, 2015).
47. Id.
48. Id. (citation omitted).
49. Id. at *3, *23–24.
50. Buehler v. City of Austin, No. A-13-CV-1100-ML, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
20878, at *25 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 20, 2015).
51. Id.
52. Id. at *21.
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federal circuits recognizing this right. Finally, Section D explores
problems with the reasonable-restrictions standard adopted by courts
that recognize a qualified First Amendment right to record police.
As a threshold matter, it is important to understand that the con-
cept described below in some cases regarding whether a First Amend-
ment right to record police in public places is clearly established
relates to the doctrine of qualified immunity from monetary liability
for government officials.53 Specifically, as the Supreme Court ob-
served in 2014, “[a] government official sued under § 1983 is entitled
to qualified immunity unless the official violated a statutory or consti-
tutional right that was clearly established at the time of the challenged
conduct.”54 Put slightly differently, “courts may not award damages
against a government official in his personal capacity unless” the con-
stitutional right the official allegedly violated was clearly established
when the violation occurred.55 Qualified immunity questions thus
arise, in cases relevant for this Article, when deciding if the First
Amendment right to record police performing their duties in public
places was clearly established at the time that right allegedly was vio-
lated, not at the time the case was heard.
B. Federal Circuit Courts Not Yet Recognizing the Right to Record
and Some Rumblings Below from Their District Courts
This Section reviews cases by federal circuit courts—specifically, the
U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Third and Fourth Circuit—that have
rejected recognition of a clearly established First Amendment right to
record police officers performing their duties in public places. In addi-
tion, it examines opinions regarding that same right rendered since
January 1, 2013, by district courts within other circuits that have yet to
address the issue. As becomes evident, several district courts within
these latter circuits appear to be leaning favorably toward acknowl-
edging the right to record.
1. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
The Second Circuit, as becomes clear in the discussion that follows,
has not directly addressed whether there is a First Amendment right
to record police performing their duties in public places. However,
four opinions issued since January 1, 2013, by district courts within
that circuit—three from the influential Southern District of New York
and one from Connecticut—have tackled the question. Most notably
and most recently, a May 2015 decision by a judge in the Southern
53. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009) (observing that “[q]ualified
immunity is applicable unless the official’s conduct violated a clearly established con-
stitutional right”).
54. Carroll v. Carman, 135 S. Ct. 348, 350 (2014) (emphasis added) (discussing 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (2012)).
55. Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2381 (2014).
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District of New York lays the foundation for future recognition of
such a right by the Second Circuit.
In that case, Higginbotham v. City of New York,56 U.S. District
Judge P. Kevin Castel considered whether the November 2011 arrest
of freelance video-journalist Douglas Higginbotham while filming the
Occupy Wall Street protest in lower Manhattan violated his First
Amendment rights.57 Higginbotham was filming the arrest from the
top of a telephone booth in order to get a better view.58 He argued
that the police “retaliated against him for filming a violent arrest, in
violation of his First Amendment rights.”59
Judge Castel initially noted that neither the Supreme Court nor the
Second Circuit had considered whether there was a First Amendment
right to record public police activity.60 The judge was positively per-
suaded to recognize the right, however, based on precedent from
other federal circuits.61 Specifically, Castel wrote that all of the other
circuit courts that have addressed the issue “have concluded that the
First Amendment protects the right to record police officers perform-
ing their duties in a public space, subject to reasonable time, place and
manner restrictions.”62 Here, he cited decisions by the First,63 Sev-
enth,64 Ninth,65 and Eleventh Circuits,66 each of which is addressed
later in Section C of this part of the Article.
Judge Castel agreed with the rulings from this quartet of circuits,67
reasoning that “if one accepts that photographing and filming receive
First Amendment protection as a general matter (at least when they
are ‘expressive’), it is difficult to see why that protection should disap-
pear simply because their subject is public police activity.”68 If any-
thing, Castel suggested, recording such activity deserves heightened
protection because it relates to the actions of government officials
(police officers) and their potential misconduct.69
When considering the question of qualified immunity for the New
York City officers involved in Higginbotham’s arrest in November
2011, Castel found “that the right to record police activity in public, at
56. Higginbotham v. City of New York, No. 14-cv-8549 (PKC)(RLE), 2015 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 62227 (S.D.N.Y. May 12, 2015).
57. Id. at *1–3.
58. Id. at *2.
59. Id. at *17.
60. Id. at *20.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2011).
64. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2012).
65. Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55 F.3d 436 (9th Cir. 1995).
66. Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332 (11th Cir. 2000).
67. Higginbotham, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62227, at *20.
68. Id. at *20–21.
69. See id. at *21 (citing Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett,
131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011); Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030 (1991)).
144 TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3
least in the case of a journalist who is otherwise unconnected to the
events recorded, was in fact ‘clearly established’ at the time of the
events alleged in the complaint.”70 He pointed out that, by that date,
“the First, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits had all concluded that the
right exists.”71
Castel also rejected the notion that decisions from the Third and
Fourth Circuits in Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle72 and Szymecki v.
Houck,73 respectively—decisions addressed later in this Section—cre-
ated a split of authority with the First, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh
Circuits. Judge Castel reasoned here that:
Kelly and Szymecki did not decide whether the right existed: they
merely held that, even if it did exist, it was not clearly established
for the purposes of qualified immunity in those cases’ factual con-
texts. They are thus not relevant to the question whether there is a
consensus on the existence of a journalist’s right to record events in
which he is otherwise a non-participant.74
He further distinguished Kelly and Szymecki because the plaintiff in
each case was affiliated with or related “to the person being stopped
or arrested by the police.”75 Douglas Higginbotham, conversely, “had
no relation to the arrestees he was filming, and was at a remove from
the arrest.”76
Yet Castel also concluded that the First Amendment right to record
police is not absolute.77 Specifically, the right exists only when the re-
cording is done “from a reasonable distance,”78 and, in turn, it ceases
to exist “when the recording would impede police officers in the per-
formance of their duties.”79 Judge Castel added that the right to re-
cord police activity in a public space “may not apply in particularly
dangerous situations, if the recording interferes with the police activ-
ity, if it is surreptitious, if it is done by the subject of the police activ-
ity, or if the police activity is part of an undercover investigation.”80
In the case before him, however, Judge Castel found that none of
these five exceptions applied to Douglas Higginbotham.81 Judge Cas-
tel reasoned:
70. Id. at *22.
71. Id. at *23.
72. Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248 (3d Cir. 2010).
73. Szymecki v. Houck, 353 Fed. App’x 852 (4th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
74. Higginbotham, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62227, at *24–25 (citations omitted).
75. Id. at *25.
76. Id.
77. See id. (observing that “the right to record police activity in a public space is
not without limits, and some uncertainty may exist on its outer bounds”).
78. Id. at *21–22.
79. Id. at *22.
80. Id. at *25–26.
81. Id. at *26.
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The complaint alleges that [Higginbotham] was a professional jour-
nalist present to record a public demonstration for broadcast and
not a participant in the events leading up to the arrest he was film-
ing. There is nothing in the complaint suggesting that his filming
interfered with the arrest. Accordingly, and in light of the case law
consensus described above, a reasonable police officer would have
been on notice that retaliating against a non-participant, profes-
sional journalist for filming an arrest under the circumstances al-
leged would violate the First Amendment.82
Judge Castel’s Higginbotham opinion stands in direct contrast on
the split-of-authority issue to the January 2013 ruling by Judge J. Paul
Oetken, also of the Southern District of New York, in Mesa v. City of
New York.83 In Mesa, Judge Oetken determined that “the right to
photograph and record police is not clearly established as a matter of
constitutional law in this Circuit.”84 In reaching this result, he empha-
sized that “no Second Circuit case has directly addressed the constitu-
tionality of the recording of officers engaged in official conduct.”85
Oetken also pointed to a split of authority among the other federal
circuits, with the First, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits recogniz-
ing such a right, while the Third and Fourth Circuits “decided just the
opposite, declining to extend First Amendment protections to the re-
cording of police activity.”86 He pointed to Kelly and Szymecki—
Third and Fourth Circuit opinions, respectively, which declined to rec-
ognize a constitutional right.87 Judge Oetken’s determination here
thus diametrically opposes that of Judge Castel in Higginbotham who,
just two years later, considered the exact same cases and refused to
find a split of authority.88 While Oetken found that Kelly and
Szymecki created a split of authority, Castel deemed those cases
irrelevant.
Oetken, however, did seem personally amenable to recognizing
such a right. As he put it, “this Court is inclined to agree with the
First, Seventh, Eleventh, and Ninth Circuits that the photography and
recording of police officers engaged in their official duties ‘fits com-
fortably’ within First Amendment principles.”89 Thus, while both
Judges Castel and Oetken personally support the recognition of a First
Amendment right to record police, only Judge Castel was willing to
formally recognize it as law.
82. Id.
83. Mesa v. City of New York, No. 09 Civ. 10464 (JPO), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
1097 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2013).
84. Id. at *76.
85. Id.
86. Id. at *75.
87. Id.
88. See supra text accompanying notes 60–71.
89. Mesa, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1097, at *75–76.
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A third judge from the Southern District of New York also recently
considered the right-to-record issue. In September 2013, U.S. District
Judge Jesse Furman found that as of October 17, 2010 (the date of the
recording incident at issue in the case), the right to video record police
officers in the course of their official duties was not clearly estab-
lished, for purposes of a qualified-immunity defense, in the Second
Circuit.90 He pointed out that “because neither the Supreme Court
nor the Second Circuit has addressed the right in question . . . it fol-
lows that the right was not clearly established on October 17, 2010.”91
Importantly, Judge Furman made it clear in Ortiz v. City of New
York that he was not addressing whether a constitutional right to re-
cord police exists, but rather whether it was clearly established for pur-
poses of qualified immunity.92 As he wrote, even if plaintiff Anibal
Ortiz “alleged a constitutional violation, Defendants are entitled to
qualified immunity, and Plaintiff’s First Amendment claims are dis-
missed on that ground alone.”93
The fourth district court decision within the Second Circuit since
January 2013 to address the right-to-record issue is the March 2015
ruling by Judge Vanessa Bryant of Connecticut in Rivera v. Foley,94
which was described earlier.95 After noting that the Second Circuit
had not addressed the question, she found that “other circuits are split
on this issue.”96 Specifically, she pointed to the Third and Fourth Cir-
cuits—the courts that issued the rulings in Kelly and Szymecki, respec-
tively, and that were cited by Judge Oetken in Mesa as establishing a
split of authority97—as not recognizing a First Amendment right to
record police.98 As noted earlier, Judge Castel would disagree with
Judge Bryant’s split-of-authority determination just two months later
in Higginbotham.99
Rivera presents an interesting factual twist, however, on the right-
to-record issue. That is because the camera in question was mounted
on a drone, which plaintiff Pedro Rivera described “as a remote-con-
trolled model aircraft outfitted for recording digital images.”100 He
used it to record images of a vehicular accident scene.101 Importantly,
Rivera was standing outside of the crime-scene area but flew the
90. Ortiz v. City of New York, No. 11 Civ. 7919 (JMF), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
136897, at *10–11 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2013).
91. Id. (citing Mesa, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1097, at *25).
92. Id. at *10–11.
93. Id. at *11.
94. Rivera v. Foley, No. 3:14-cv-00196 (VLB), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35639 (D.
Conn. Mar. 23, 2015).
95. See supra notes 47–49 and accompanying text.
96. Rivera, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35639, at *24.
97. See supra notes 83–87 and accompanying text.
98. Rivera, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35639, at *24.
99. See supra notes 73–76 and accompanying text.
100. Rivera, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35639, at *3.
101. Id.
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drone about 150 feet directly above it.102 Judge Bryant was reticent to
recognize any First Amendment right based on these facts, reasoning
that:
plaintiff directed a flying object into a police-restricted area, where
it proceeded to hover over the site of a major motor vehicle acci-
dent and the responding officers within it, effectively trespassing
onto an active crime scene. Even if recording police activity were a
clearly established right in the Second Circuit, Plaintiff’s conduct is
beyond the scope of that right as it has been articulated by other
circuits.103
The bottom line from Higginbotham, Mesa, Ortiz, and Rivera is that
while the Second Circuit has yet to address the right to record, Judge
Castel’s May 2015 opinion in Higginbotham breaks new ground in
that direction, clearing the way for future recognition by the Second
Circuit. The recognition of such a right within the Second Circuit and
now, per Judge Castel’s Higginbotham ruling, within the Southern
District of New York is crucial because New York City is a major me-
tropolis where allegations of police misconduct are in the news spot-
light104 and where videos of police already have had a profound
impact. As a July 2014 article in The New York Times explained:
Over the past several years, videos have sometimes resulted in
prosecution of officers or disciplinary proceedings. Video from 2008
that showed a police officer named Patrick Pogan knocking over a
bicyclist in Times Square, has received nearly three million views on
You Tube [sic]. The officer was eventually convicted of making false
statements about the episode in a criminal complaint.105
New York City also is where, in December 2014, a grand jury chose
not to indict a white police officer, Daniel Pantaleo, in the chokehold
death of a black man, Eric Garner, that was captured on a citizen-
taken video.106 William J. Bratton, commissioner of New York City
police, acknowledged in February 2015 that his force has “a problem
with citizen satisfaction” in minority communities and that “[w]e’re
often abrupt, sometimes rude, and that’s unacceptable.”107 In such a
combustible atmosphere, it is paramount that New York City citizens
possess a right to record officers performing their duties in public.
In contrast to the clear First Amendment victory in Higginbotham,
Judge Bryant’s Rivera decision suggests judicial reluctance to recog-
102. Id.
103. Id. at *25–26 (citation omitted).
104. See, e.g., J. David Goodman, Bratton Spurned 25% of Board’s Misconduct
Findings in First Half of ’14, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2014, at A19.
105. Colin Moynihan, Suit Seeks to Establish Right to Record New York Police Of-
ficers, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2014), http://nyti.ms/1ynMPJq.
106. J. David Goodman & Al Baker, New York Officer Facing No Charges in
Chokehold Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2014, at A1.
107. J. David Goodman, Police Commissioner, Speaking on Racism in America,
Says Officers Must Fight It, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2015, at A19.
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nize a First Amendment right to record when the recording is made by
drones flying directly above a crime scene. Whether other judges
choose to carve out a drone-recording exception from a First Amend-
ment right to record police in public remains to be seen.
2. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
In January 2015, U.S. District Judge William Yohn Jr. of Penn-
sylvania observed in Montgomery v. Killingsworth108 that “[w]hether
the Third Circuit will eventually decide to follow what appears to be a
growing trend in other circuits to recognize a First Amendment right
to observe and record police activity is, of course, not for this court to
decide.”109 In Killingsworth, Yohn had to consider, for purposes of
qualified immunity, the state of the law within the Third Circuit in
2011—when the arrests at issue occurred.110 In doing so, he turned to
the Third Circuit’s 2010 decision in Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle.111
In Kelly, the Third Circuit addressed whether Brian Kelly’s First
Amendment rights were violated when he was arrested in May 2007
for videotaping a police officer during a traffic stop.112 Kelly was a
passenger in a vehicle pulled over for speeding by Officer David Rog-
ers, and Kelly proceeded to record the driver’s encounter with Rogers
using a hand-held video camera.113 Rogers arrested Kelly for allegedly
violating Pennsylvania’s wiretap law “[b]ecause Kelly had not in-
formed Rogers that he was recording.”114
The Third Circuit concluded that, at the time Kelly recorded Rog-
ers, “the right to videotape police officers during traffic stops was not
clearly established.”115 The Third Circuit reasoned, in part, that the
Supreme Court considers traffic stops “inherently dangerous situa-
tions.”116 The appellate court did suggest, however, that even if a
more general “right to record matters of public concern”117 existed in
May 2007, it “is not absolute; it is subject to reasonable time, place,
and manner restrictions.”118 In other words, it would be a qualified
constitutional right.
108. Montgomery v. Killingsworth, Nos. 13cv256; 13cv3081; 13cv3082, 2015 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 7152 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 21, 2015).
109. Id. at *41 n.7.
110. See id. at *36 (noting that “this inquiry focuses only on the state of the law at
the time of the arrests: January 23, 2011, for Montgomery, and July 14, 2011, for
Loeb”).
111. Id. at *39–40 (discussing Kelly v. Borough of Carlise, 622 F.3d 248 (3d Cir.
2010)).
112. Kelly, 622 F.3d at 251.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 251–52.
115. Id. at 263.
116. Id. at 262 (citing Arizona v. Johnson, 129 S. Ct. 781, 786 (2009)).
117. Id.
118. Id.
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In its unpublished 2013 decision in True Blue Auctions v. Foster,119
the Third Circuit reiterated Kelly’s conclusion that “our case law does
not clearly establish a right to videotape police officers performing
their official duties.”120 Foster differed from Kelly in a seemingly im-
portant way—specifically, Foster did not involve a traffic stop, but
rather the video recording of officers standing on a public sidewalk.121
Yet the Third Circuit in Foster refused to recognize a First Amend-
ment right to record in such venues, pointing out that lower courts
within the circuit are divided on the issue.122 “[O]ur case law does not
clearly establish a right to videotape police officers performing their
official duties,”123 it concluded. Foster is the most recent Third Circuit
case to address the issue.
In February 2014, Judge Stewart Dalzell of the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania openly acknowledged in Fleck v. Trustees of the Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania124 that the decisions described immediately above
in both Kelly and Foster place the Third Circuit “in the minority
among those circuits that have considered the free speech right to
openly record police activity.”125 He wrote that, in light of recent deci-
sions by other circuits recognizing such a right, as well as a brief filed
by the U.S. Department of Justice acknowledging that right,126 “the
determination of a clearly established right to record police activity
119. True Blue Auctions v. Foster, 528 F. App’x 190 (3d Cir. 2013).
120. Id. at 193.
121. Id. at 192.
122. Id. at 193.
123. Id.
124. Fleck v. Trs. of the Univ. of Pa., 995 F. Supp. 2d 390 (E.D. Pa. 2014).
125. Id. at 407 n.13.
126. See Statement of Interest of the United States at 1, Sharp v. Balt. City Police
Dep’t, No. 1:11-cv-02888-BEL (D. Md. Jan. 10, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/crt/
about/spl/documents/Sharp_SOI_1-10-12.pdf [http://perma.cc/83VB-FGH3]. The brief
provides, in relevant part:
This litigation presents constitutional questions of great moment in this
digital age: whether private citizens have a First Amendment right to record
police officers in the public discharge of their duties, and whether officers
violate citizens’ Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights when they seize
and destroy such recordings without a warrant or due process. The United
States urges this Court to answer both of those questions in the affirmative.
The right to record police officers while performing duties in a public place,
as well as the right to be protected from the warrantless seizure and destruc-
tion of those recordings, are not only required by the Constitution. They are
consistent with our fundamental notions of liberty, promote the accountabil-
ity of our governmental officers, and instill public confidence in the police
officers who serve us daily.
Id. In addition to this brief, the Justice Department spelled out in a May 2012 memo-
randum its “position on the basic elements of a constitutionally adequate policy on
individuals’ right to record police activity.” Letter from Jonathan M. Smith, Chief of
the Special Litig. Section, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Mark H. Grimes, Balt. Police Dep’t
at 1 (May 14, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/Sharp_ltr_5-14-
12.pdf [http://perma.cc/3GHU-BBHM].
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may be ripe for reconsideration in our Circuit.”127 For now, however,
the Third Circuit remains in the minority of federal appellate court
circuits that have directly considered the existence of a right to record
police in public places.
3. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
In 2009, the Fourth Circuit issued a very short per curiam and un-
published opinion in Szymecki v. Houck.128 There, the Fourth Circuit
agreed with a lower court that a “First Amendment right to record
police activities on public property was not clearly established in this
circuit at the time of the alleged conduct.”129 That conduct arose in
2007,130 but the appellate court opinion fails to address any specific
facts regarding the recording.
As discussed later, some courts have dismissed the importance of
Szymecki, given both its unpublished status and the exceedingly cur-
sory nature of its analysis.131 If Szymecki is, in fact, judicially jet-
tisoned as unpublished and superficial, then the Third Circuit in Kelly
is left standing as the lone federal appellate court to squarely reject
the recognition of a clearly established First Amendment right to re-
cord police in public places.
Kelly, in turn, is now five years old, and the facts upon which it is
based arose eight years ago. In brief, Kelly’s relevance may be fading
fast in the legal rearview mirror.
4. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Although the Fifth Circuit has not directly addressed whether there
is a First Amendment right to record police doing their jobs in public
venues, U.S. Magistrate Mark Lane of the Western District of Texas,
which falls within that circuit, recognized such a right in February 2015
in Buehler v. City of Austin.132 As noted earlier,133 Lane sweepingly
held that “[t]he First Amendment protects a private citizen’s right to
assemble in a public forum, receive information on a matter of public
concern—such as police officers performing their official duties—and
to record that information for the purpose of conveying that
information.”134
127. Fleck, 995 F. Supp. 2d at 408 n.13.
128. Szymecki v. Houck, 353 F. App’x 852 (4th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
129. Id. at 853.
130. Szymecki v. City of Norfolk, No. 2:08cv142, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86437, at
*1 (E.D. Va. Sept. 8, 2008), aff’d sub nom. Szymecki v. Houck, 353 F. App’x 852 (4th
Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
131. See infra notes 167–70 and accompanying text.
132. Buehler v. City of Austin, No. A-13-CV-1100-ML, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
20878 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 20, 2015).
133. See supra notes 50–52 and accompanying text.
134. Buehler, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20878, at *21.
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Lane next turned to the qualified immunity issue of whether such a
right was clearly established during the initial recording by Plaintiff
Antonio Buehler,135 which took place on January 1, 2012, during a
traffic stop of another individual, in front of a gas station, for driving
while intoxicated.136 Magistrate Lane found a “robust consensus
among circuit courts of appeals” on the date of the stop that “the right
to photograph and videotape police officers as they perform their offi-
cial duties was clearly established.”137
In recognizing this consensus, Lane failed to mention either the
Third Circuit’s decision in Kelly or the Fourth Circuit’s ruling in
Szymecki. Those are conspicuous omissions because they both were
cited by both Judge Oetken of the Southern District of New York and
Judge Bryant of Connecticut, as described above, to support the pro-
position that there is, in fact, a split of authority among the circuits.138
Magistrate Lane acknowledged that the right to record police is
qualified, rather than absolute. Specifically, he opined that it is subject
to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions.139 In holding that
the right is qualified, Lane identified competing interests that must be
balanced:
An obvious tension exists between a police officer and an individ-
ual observing and recording that police officer. As previously stated
in the Court’s order on the motion to dismiss, an individual has a
constitutional right to assemble in a public place so as to observe
and acquire information related to the police as they perform their
official duties. At the same time, a police officer must be free to
perform his official duties without undue interference so as to pro-
tect the officer and everyone in the vicinity.140
Finally, Magistrate Lane drew support for a First Amendment right
to record police in public places from a 1981 Fifth Circuit opinion,
Shillingford v. Holmes,141 that did not squarely address the issue but
involved analogous facts.142 That case involved Charles Shillingford, a
tourist in New Orleans who photographed police “apprehending a boy
on the street during a Mardi Gras parade.”143 In response, a police
officer “struck the camera and Shillingford with his nightstick, de-
stroying the camera, smashing it into Shillingford’s face and lacerating
135. Buehler was arrested a second time—on August 26, 2012—for recording po-
lice. Id. at *14–15. Because this arrest occurred after the January 1, 2012, arrest de-
scribed above in the text of the Article, it is not discussed here, as the earlier arrest is
more relevant for determining when the right to record was first clearly established.
136. Id. at *5–6.
137. Id. at *25.
138. See supra notes 83–89, 94–103 and accompanying text.
139. Buehler, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20878, at *23.
140. Id. at *24.
141. Shillingford v. Holmes, 634 F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1981), abrogated on other
grounds by Valencia v. Wiggins, 981 F.2d 1440 (5th Cir. 1993).
142. Buehler, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20878, at *21–22.
143. Shillingford, 634 F.2d at 264.
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his forehead. Mr. Shillingford was not involved in the arrest inci-
dent and did not interfere with the police in any fashion.”144
Although Shillingford’s § 1983 action focused on the physical and
personal injuries he sustained due to a government official’s alleged
use of excessive force,145 the Fifth Circuit noted that “the assault by
the policeman was unprovoked and unjustified. It was patently taken
because, as a bystander on the public streets, Shillingford was
photographing what the policeman did not want to be memorial-
ized.”146 Magistrate Lane cited this language to suggest that Shil-
lingford, in fact, recognized a First Amendment right to record police,
although the Fifth Circuit never reached that conclusion.147
No other federal court in the nation, be it trial or appellate, has
cited Shillingford when considering whether there is a First Amend-
ment right to record police performing duties in public places. Its rele-
vance thus might be considered somewhat suspect, especially since the
Fifth Circuit in Shillingford did not directly address the First Amend-
ment issue.
5. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Although the Sixth Circuit has not squarely addressed the First
Amendment right to record police working in public venues, two dis-
trict courts in two states within the circuit—one in Kentucky and one
in Ohio—examined the question in 2014 and reached very different
answers.
In February 2014, U.S. District Judge Danny Reeves of Kentucky
observed in Williams v. Boggs148 that “there is no authority from the
Sixth Circuit clearly establishing any right to film a police officer, dur-
ing a traffic stop or otherwise.”149 Judge Reeves seemed particularly
skeptical of recognizing such a right within the context of a traffic
stop, noting that “[w]hile there is some precedent from other jurisdic-
tions indicating a right exists under the First Amendment to video-
tape police in certain contexts, it is not uniform and not clearly-estab-
lished, especially in the context of traffic stops.”150 Each of the itali-
cized phrases above indicates apparent judicial hedging of bets against
acknowledging a First Amendment right to record traffic stops.
Judge Reeves further noted that the Third Circuit’s decision in
Kelly151 was “the only out-of-circuit case involving the video-record-
144. Id.
145. Id. at 265.
146. Id. at 266.
147. Buehler, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20878, at *21–22.
148. Williams v. Boggs, No. 6:13-65-DCR, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18328 (E.D. Ky.
Feb. 13, 2014).
149. Id. at *14.
150. Id. at *13 (emphasis added).
151. See supra Part II, Section B, Subsection 2 (discussing Kelly).
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ing of a police officer during a traffic stop,”152 and that Kelly “held
that such a right is not clearly established.”153 Thus, while Magistrate
Lane omitted any reference to Kelly in Buehler, and while Judge Cas-
tel in Higginbotham found Kelly completely irrelevant, Judge Reeves
in Williams squarely relied upon Kelly.
In refusing to recognize a more general, clearly established right to
record police, Judge Reeves pointed to a split of authority among the
other federal appellate circuits. Specifically, he noted that “while
three circuits have held that a right to film police officers in some cir-
cumstances is clearly established, two others have held that it is
not.”154 The “two others” Judge Reeves cited were the Third Circuit
in Kelly and the Fourth Circuit in Szymecki,155 both of which are de-
scribed earlier in this part of the Article.156 Finally, he added that
“even if the alleged right were clearly established, it would not be ab-
solute but subject to reasonable restrictions regarding time, manner
and place.”157 But Judge Reeves’s decision in Williams was not the
only one by a district court within the Sixth Circuit in 2014 to address
the right to record.
In Crawford v. Geiger,158 which like Williams was decided in Febru-
ary 2014, Senior U.S. District Judge James Carr of Ohio found “there
is a First Amendment right to openly film police officers carrying out
their duties.”159 Carr was clear, as the italicized part of the quotation
above indicates, that he was not going to “rule one way or the other
on the First Amendment right to record police officers surreptitiously.
That is not at issue in this case.”160
The notion of open-versus-surreptitious recording may be a point of
future division among courts when it comes to limiting the right to
record police. It will be recalled that Judge Castel in Higginbotham
noted that the right to record may not apply “if it is surreptitious.”161
Whether other courts focus on this point remains to be seen.
152. Williams, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18328, at *15.
153. Id.
154. Id. at *14. Specifically, Judge Reeves pointed to the decisions described earlier
in this part of the Article by the Third and Fourth Circuits in Kelly and Szymecki,
respectively, for failing to recognize a clearly established right to record police officers
performing their duties in public places. Id. at *13–14. In contrast, he found that the
First, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits had recognized some variation of such a clearly
established right. Id. at *11–12. The decisions referenced by Judge Reeves from these
latter three circuits are described later in Part II, Section C of this Article.
155. Id. at *13.
156. See supra notes 112–18 (addressing Kelly) and 128–31 (addressing Szymecki)
and accompanying text.
157. Williams, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18328, at *15.
158. Crawford v. Geiger, 996 F. Supp. 2d 603 (N.D. Ohio 2014).
159. Id. at 615 (emphasis added).
160. Id. at 615 n.9.
161. Higginbotham v. City of New York, No. 14-cv-8549 (PKC)(RLE), 2015 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 62227, at *25–26 (S.D.N.Y. May 12, 2015).
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A blanket surreptitious-recording exception to a general First
Amendment right to record police in public places, however, would be
particularly damaging to investigative journalists.162 Imagine, for in-
stance, investigative journalists (or simply inquisitive and concerned
neighborhood citizens) who, while sitting in a vehicle parked on a
public street, use video cameras, pointed from behind dark-tinted win-
dows, to record police confronting homeless individuals in a public
park adjacent to the street. This certainly seems to be surreptitious
recording of police in a public place; the police would not know they
are being watched or recorded. Yet such recording also seems in no
way to interfere with the actions of the police in the park. In brief,
then, a blanket “no surreptitious recording” exception seems to make
little sense; it simply goes too far.
Judge Carr concluded on the qualified immunity question in Craw-
ford that “as of August 26, 2012, the right of a citizen to film police
activity in a public setting where there was no present danger of harm
to officers or others was clearly established.”163 Although he noted
that “[t]he Sixth Circuit has not ruled specifically on the right of the
public openly to film police officers and their actions in a public set-
ting,”164 Carr stressed that the First, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh
Circuits “have found the right unquestionably exists under the First
Amendment.”165 Carr wrote that at the time of the August 2012 en-
counter in the case before him, “the First, Seventh, Ninth, and Elev-
enth Circuits had issued clear and consistent opinions finding that the
First Amendment right to openly record police activity existed. There
was no indistinguishable circuit opinion to the contrary.”166
Notably, on this last observation, Judge Carr denigrated the impor-
tance of the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Szymecki167 in terms of it sup-
posedly contradicting the views of the First, Seventh, Ninth, and
Eleventh Circuits. Specifically, Carr pointed to “the complete absence
of substantive analysis or discussion”168 by the Fourth Circuit in
Szymecki in suggesting why the right to record police in public places
was not clearly established. He wrote that the Fourth Circuit reached
its conclusion “without discussing facts or law.”169 He also emphasized
162. See generally JAMES S. ETTEMA & THEODORE L. GLASSER, CUSTODIANS OF
CONSCIENCE: INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM AND PUBLIC VIRTUE 3 (1998) (contending
that the work of investigative journalists “calls us, as a society, to decide what is, and
what is not, an outrage to our sense of moral order and to consider our expectations
for our officials, our institutions, and ultimately ourselves,” and asserting that “their
stories implicitly demand the response of public officials”).
163. Crawford, 996 F. Supp. 2d at 616.
164. Id. at 614.
165. Id. at 614–15.
166. Id. at 617.
167. See supra Part II, Section B, Subsection 3 (discussing Szymecki).
168. Crawford, 996 F. Supp. 2d at 616.
169. Id.
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that Szymecki lacks any precedential effect as an unreported
decision.170
Judge Carr also distinguished the Third Circuit’s decision in
Kelly.171 Specifically, he observed that while Kelly dealt with a traffic
stop, the case before him centered on plaintiffs who “were outside on
their own property”172 and used cellphones to record their own con-
frontation with police regarding a possible break-in on the
property.173
Crawford thus suggests that, in contrast to Judge Reeves’s decision
in Williams, there is some traction, at least within one sector of the
Sixth Circuit, for that appellate court to recognize in the near future a
First Amendment right to record police in public venues.
6. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
In February 2014, U.S. District Judge James Browning of New Mex-
ico observed that the Tenth Circuit has not “directly addressed a
right—constitutional or otherwise—to record police or law enforce-
ment activity in public.”174 He noted that the circuits that have recog-
nized such a right had qualified it, such that the right is subject to the
imposition of reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions.175 Un-
fortunately, Judge Browning’s decision in Mocek v. City of Albuquer-
que represents the only judicial guidance on the right-to-record issue
within the Tenth Circuit as of June 1, 2015.
C. Recognizing a First Amendment Right to Record Police
Performing Duties in Public Places
Four federal circuits—the First, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh—now
recognize, in some form, a qualified First Amendment right to record
police performing their jobs in public venues. The most recent federal
appellate court to address the right-to-record issue was the First Cir-
cuit in May 2014 in Gericke v. Begin.176 There, the First Circuit
squarely recognized a First Amendment right of citizens to film gov-
ernment officials, including police officers, performing their duties in
public places.177 Specifically, the appellate court concluded that, when
Carla Gericke attempted to film an officer conducting a late-night
traffic stop in Weare, Massachusetts, in March 2010, “she was exercis-
170. Id.
171. Id. at 615–16.
172. Id. at 615.
173. Id. at 608.
174. Mocek v. City of Albuquerque, 3 F. Supp. 3d 1002, 1057 (D.N.M. 2014).
175. Id. at 1057–58.
176. Gericke v. Begin, 753 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2014).
177. Id. at 7–10.
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ing a clearly established First Amendment right . . . in the absence of a
police order to stop filming or leave the area.”178
The First Circuit observed in Gericke that First Amendment princi-
ples regarding gathering information about government officials “ap-
ply equally to the filming of a traffic stop and the filming of an arrest
in a public park.”179 The court emphasized that “[a] traffic stop, no
matter the additional circumstances, is inescapably a police duty car-
ried out in public. Hence, a traffic stop does not extinguish an individ-
ual’s right to film.”180 In June 2014, the town of Weare paid $57,500 to
settle Carla Gericke’s lawsuit.181
Gericke, in turn, sprang largely from the First Circuit’s decision only
three years prior in Glik v. Cunniffe.182 That case arose after Simon
Glik was arrested on October 1, 2007, for using his cellphone to cap-
ture video of three police officers arresting another individual in Bos-
ton Common.183 In Glik, the First Circuit found that “a citizen’s right
to film government officials, including law enforcement officers, in the
discharge of their duties in a public space is a basic, vital, and well-
established liberty safeguarded by the First Amendment.”184 Glik, in
fact, went so far as to recognize a sweeping “First Amendment right to
gather news”185 that extends well beyond members of traditional, pro-
fessional, and legacy news media to encompass “bystanders with a
ready cell phone or digital camera.”186
The First Circuit in Glik drew seemingly significant support for its
finding from the following logic: if police officers, as the Supreme
Court has held, must put up with “a significant amount of verbal criti-
cism and challenge directed at”187 them, then surely they must be ex-
pected to exercise similar restraint “when they are merely the subject
178. Id. at 3.
179. Id. at 7.
180. Id.
181. Doug Alden, Weare Settles Police Lawsuit over Arrest for Video Recording,
N.H. UNION LEADER (Manchester) (June 6, 2014), http://www.unionleader.com/apps/
pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20140607/NEWS07/140609237/1022/newhampshire0301.
182. Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2011).
183. Id. at 79–80.
184. Id. at 85.
185. Id. at 83.
186. Id. at 84. The First Circuit emphasized, regarding this point, that:
changes in technology and society have made the lines between private citi-
zen and journalist exceedingly difficult to draw. The proliferation of elec-
tronic devices with video-recording capability means that many of our
images of current events come from bystanders with a ready cell phone or
digital camera rather than a traditional film crew, and news stories are now
just as likely to be broken by a blogger at her computer as a reporter at a
major newspaper. Such developments make clear why the news-gathering
protections of the First Amendment cannot turn on professional credentials
or status.
Id.
187. City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 461 (1987).
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of videotaping that memorializes, without impairing, their work in
public spaces.”188 Put more bluntly, if the First Amendment protects a
good amount of yelling and name-calling directed at police, then it
certainly must also protect a good amount of camera pointing. Simon
Glik, who did no more than point a phone camera, ultimately received
a $170,000 settlement.189
In summary, the First Amendment right to record police that Glik
initially recognized in filming an arrest in a public park was later ex-
tended to the realm of traffic stops in Gericke. Recall that, in contrast
to Gericke, the Third Circuit in Kelly refused to recognize a right to
record in a traffic stop case, pointing out that the nation’s high court
considers traffic stops to be inherently dangerous.190
The First Circuit’s decisions in Gericke and Glik follow more than a
full decade on the heels of those in two other federal circuits. In 2000,
the Eleventh Circuit recognized in Smith v. City of Cumming191 “a
First Amendment right, subject to reasonable time, manner and place
restrictions, to photograph or videotape police conduct. The First
Amendment protects the right to gather information about what pub-
lic officials do on public property, and specifically, a right to record
matters of public interest.”192 Five years prior to Smith, the Ninth Cir-
cuit acknowledged a general and broad “First Amendment right to
film matters of public interest.”193 That decision involved the use of a
video camera to film police in the context of a public march in Seattle
in 1990.194 It was handed down in 1995, long before the advent of the
smartphones now used to capture video like that in North Charleston,
South Carolina. An unpublished 2013 ruling by the Ninth Circuit,
however, involving the use of a cellphone to take pictures of police at
an accident scene, suggests the existence of such a clearly established
right in that circuit.195
More recently, a federal district court in California, which falls
within the Ninth Circuit, recognized in 2014 that “under the law of this
circuit there is and was on December 7, 2012, a clearly established
right to record police officers carrying out their official duties.”196 In
that case, a citizen recorded police officers using her laptop while they
188. Glik, 655 F.3d at 84.
189. Eric Ernst, It’s Police Lights, Camera, Payout, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIB.
(Fla.), Apr. 13, 2012, at B1.
190. Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 262 (3d Cir. 2010).
191. Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332 (11th Cir. 2000).
192. Id. at 1333.
193. Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55 F.3d 436, 439 (9th Cir. 1995).
194. Id. at 438.
195. Adkins v. Limtiaco, 537 Fed. App’x 721, 721–22 (9th Cir. 2013).
196. Crago v. Leonard, No. 2:13-cv-531-TLN-EFB PS, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
107578, at *12 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2014).
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searched her private residence.197 Magistrate Edmund Brennan con-
cluded that:
[t]here simply is no principled basis upon which to find that al-
though the right to record officers conducting their official duties
only extends to duties performed in public, the right does not ex-
tend to those performed in a private residence. The public’s interest
in ensuring that police officers properly carry out their duties and
do not abuse the authority bestowed on them by society does not
cease once they enter the private residence of a citizen.198
Another California federal district court in 2014 also concluded that
“videotaping of police officers carrying out their duties in a public
place is an exercise of First Amendment liberties.”199
In 2012, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Amer-
ican Civil Liberties Union of Illinois v. Alvarez200 became the fourth
circuit to recognize the right to record police in public. In doing so, it
emphasized that both the right to record and the right to disseminate a
recording are protected by the First Amendment. Writing for a two-
judge majority, Judge Diane Sykes opined:
The act of making an audio or audiovisual recording is necessarily
included within the First Amendment’s guarantee of speech and
press rights as a corollary of the right to disseminate the resulting
recording. The right to publish or broadcast an audio or audiovisual
recording would be insecure, or largely ineffective, if the antecedent
act of making the recording is wholly unprotected . . . .201
In Alvarez, the Seventh Circuit considered the constitutionality of a
state eavesdropping statute202 as applied “against people who openly
record police officers performing their official duties in public.”203 The
majority reasoned the statute “interferes with the gathering and dis-
semination of information about government officials performing
their duties in public. Any way you look at it, the eavesdropping stat-
ute burdens speech and press rights and is subject to heightened First
Amendment scrutiny.”204 In reaching this decision, the Seventh Cir-
cuit majority favorably cited the First Circuit’s ruling in Glik.205 It also
found that Glik aligned with the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling in Smith.206
197. Id. at *2.
198. Id. at *13.
199. Rouzan v. Dorta, No. EDCV 12-1361-BRO (JPR), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
61012, at *34 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2014).
200. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2012).
201. Id. at 595.
202. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-2(a)(1) (2012).
203. Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 586.
204. Id. at 600.
205. Id. at 600–01.
206. Id. at 601 n.10.
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D. Qualifying the First Amendment Right to Record Police: The
Reasonableness Approach to Restrictions
The First Circuit in both Gericke and Glik, as well as the Eleventh
Circuit in Smith and several of the district court decisions discussed
above,207 each qualified the First Amendment right to record police in
public places, making clear it is not absolute. The fact that it is a quali-
fied right, however, is not, at least standing alone, what is troubling.
After all, the Supreme Court long has recognized that, despite the
First Amendment’s seemingly absolutist language of “no law,”208
there are multiple categories of speech that simply receive no consti-
tutional protection.209 Furthermore, even content-based restrictions
on speech are permissible if they satisfy the strict scrutiny standard of
judicial review.210 Additionally, the First Amendment right of access
to certain criminal proceedings is qualified, not absolute.211 In brief,
then, the mere fact that a nascent First Amendment right to film po-
lice officers carrying out their jobs in public places is not absolute
comes as little surprise.
207. See Buehler v. City of Austin, No. A-13-CV-1100-ML, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
20878, at *23 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 20, 2015) (noting that the First Amendment right to
record police is “subject to reasonable time, place and manner restrictions”); Higgin-
botham v. City of New York, No. 14-cv-8549 (PKC)(RLE), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
62227, at *25–26 (S.D.N.Y. May 12, 2015) (observing that “the right to record police
activity in a public space is not without limits, and some uncertainty may exist on its
outer bounds,” and stating that “it may not apply in particularly dangerous situations,
if the recording interferes with the police activity, if it is surreptitious, if it is done by
the subject of the police activity, or if the police activity is part of an undercover
investigation”).
208. See supra note 27 (setting forth the relevant portion of the First Amendment,
including the phrase “no law”).
209. See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544 (2012) (identifying true
threats, incitement of imminent lawless action, obscenity, defamation, speech integral
to criminal conduct, fighting words, child pornography, and fraud as unprotected cate-
gories of expression); United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468–69 (2010) (identify-
ing obscenity, defamation, fraud, incitement, and speech integral to criminal conduct
as types of speech not protected by the First Amendment); Ashcroft v. Free Speech
Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 245–46 (2002) (noting that the First Amendment does “not em-
brace certain categories of speech, including defamation, incitement, obscenity, and
pornography produced with real children”).
210. See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011) (asserting
that because a California law limiting minors’ access to violent video games “imposes
a restriction on the content of protected speech, it is invalid unless California can
demonstrate that it passes strict scrutiny—that is, unless it is justified by a compelling
government interest and is narrowly drawn to serve that interest”); United States v.
Playboy Entm’t Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (asserting that a content-based speech
restriction can only stand judicial review “if it satisfies strict scrutiny,” opining that
“[i]f a statute regulates speech based on its content, it must be narrowly tailored to
promote a compelling Government interest,” and adding that “if a less restrictive al-
ternative would serve the Government’s purpose, the legislature must use that
alternative”).
211. Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 9 (1986) (asserting that “even
when a right of access attaches, it is not absolute”).
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What is highly problematic, however, is the extremely flexible and
malleable test adopted in Gericke, Glik, and Smith for determining
when the right to record may permissibly be extinguished. “Reasona-
ble restrictions on the exercise of the right to film may be imposed
when the circumstances justify them,”212 the First Circuit wrote in
Gericke. It added that “a police order that is specifically directed at
the First Amendment right to film police performing their duties in
public may be constitutionally imposed only if the officer can reasona-
bly conclude that the filming itself is interfering, or is about to inter-
fere, with his duties.”213 The appellate court pounded home its
nebulous reasonableness standard in Gericke, opining that “an indi-
vidual’s exercise of her First Amendment right to film police activity
carried out in public, including a traffic stop, necessarily remains un-
fettered unless and until a reasonable restriction is imposed or in
place.”214
In Glik, the First Circuit wrote that the right to record “may be
subject to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions.”215 Unfor-
tunately, it also found “no occasion to explore those limitations
here,”216 thus leaving them in legal limbo. Similarly, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit in Smith v. City of Cumming217 wrote that the First Amendment
right to photograph or videotape police conduct was “subject to rea-
sonable time, manner and place restrictions,”218 but it failed to elabo-
rate on that point.
The trouble, of course, is fathoming the reasonableness of a record-
ing restriction in any given situation. Furthermore, the challenge, at
least from a pro-First Amendment perspective, is compounded due to
the judicial deference likely to be granted to law enforcement person-
nel.219 As Professor L. Song Richardson observes, “courts repeatedly
defer to the judgments of all officers, with no inquiry into the particu-
lar officer’s training, experience, and skill.”220
Ultimately, what a police officer claims constitutes a reasonable re-
striction on the right be filmed is not likely to be the same as what a
citizen-journalist or First Amendment advocate believes is reasonable.
212. Gericke v. Begin, 753 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2014) (emphasis added).
213. Id. at 8 (emphasis added).
214. Id. (emphasis added).
215. Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 84 (1st Cir. 2011).
216. Id.
217. Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332 (11th Cir. 2000).
218. Id. at 1333.
219. See Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 773 (2005) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (noting “the importance of according proper deference to law enforce-
ment professionals”); see also Craig Hemmens & Daniel Levin, “Not a Law at All”: A
Call for a Return to the Common Law Right to Resist Unlawful Arrest, 29 Sw. U. L.
Rev. 1, 7 (1999) (contending there is “increased deference given to police authority by
contemporary courts”).
220. L. Song Richardson, Police Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 87 IND. L.J.
1143, 1155 (2012).
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The police officer and the citizen-journalist inevitably approach the
same situation from very different perspectives and with very dispa-
rate objectives. While an officer speaking with a driver during a traffic
stop is rightfully concerned about both her own safety and that of the
public, as well as following Fourth Amendment-derived protocol, a
citizen-journalist recording the same encounter is centered on docu-
menting the officer-driver interaction with sufficient clarity and defini-
tion that it can accurately and impartially reveal to the public what
transpires.
The use of reasonableness, however, as the key concept in Gericke,
Glik, and Smith is not surprising. It squarely comports with what Pro-
fessor Eric Miller describes as “the Supreme Court’s expansion of
‘reasonableness’ as a post hoc standard by which to evaluate police
conduct.”221 Indeed, the “reasonableness inquiry . . . lies at the heart
of contemporary Fourth Amendment doctrine.”222
This is particularly true in the realm of Fourth Amendment searches
and seizures since the Court’s ruling nearly fifty years ago in Terry v.
Ohio.223 In Terry, the Court wrote that “the central inquiry under the
Fourth Amendment [is] the reasonableness in all the circumstances of
the particular governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal secur-
ity.”224 Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote for the Court that:
[t]he scheme of the Fourth Amendment becomes meaningful only
when it is assured that at some point the conduct of those charged
with enforcing the laws can be subjected to the more detached, neu-
tral scrutiny of a judge who must evaluate the reasonableness of a
particular search or seizure in light of the particular
circumstances.225
As Professors Jeffrey Fagan and Amanda Geller wrote in the Uni-
versity of Chicago Law Review in 2015, “Terry’s rules formed the rea-
sonableness core of a new regime governing what police can do and
when.”226 Professor Wayne Logan elaborates that a “principal area for
police mistakes in the constitutional law realm concerns Fourth
Amendment procedural doctrine. Here, the constitutional reasonable-
ness of police behavior, and potential application of the good-faith
exception to the exclusionary rule, is measured by how the behavior
sizes up against court-made standards.”227
221. Eric J. Miller, Role-Based Policing: Restraining Police Conduct “Outside the
Legitimate Investigative Sphere,” 94 CALIF. L. REV. 617, 622 (2006).
222. David Gray & Danielle Citron, The Right to Quantitative Privacy, 98 MINN. L.
REV. 62, 130 (2013).
223. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
224. Id. at 19 (emphasis added).
225. Id. at 21 (emphasis added).
226. Jeffrey Fagan & Amanda Geller, Following the Script: Narratives of Suspicion
in Terry Stops in Street Policing, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 51, 53 (2015).
227. Wayne A. Logan, Police Mistakes of Law, 61 EMORY L.J. 69, 77 (2011).
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The ultimate problem is, as Professor Daniel Solove asserts, that
under the Fourth Amendment, “[t]he standard of ‘reasonableness’ is a
rather toothless one.”228 Reasonableness simply provides too much
discretion to police to censor the First Amendment rights of citizens
to capture videos and photographs, especially because courts view dis-
cretion “as a desirable feature of law enforcement professionalism.”229
Reasonableness “is not a bright-line rule, but instead a flexible ap-
proach that the Court adopted because of its elasticity in the face of
widely varying situations implicating the Fourth Amendment.”230 Al-
though controlling police discretion is “a goal that lies at the very
heart of Fourth Amendment reasonableness,”231 something more rig-
orous is needed to cabin discretion when competing First Amendment
interests are at stake.
Indeed, the next Part argues that multiple First Amendment inter-
ests mandate a more precise and heightened form of judicial review
than mere reasonableness in right-to-record cases.
III. DISCOVERING THE TRUTH ABOUT POLICE CONDUCT AND THE
NEED TO ACCOUNT FOR FIRST AMENDMENT INTERESTS:
WHY REASONABLENESS FAILS AS THE LEGAL
STANDARD
In Branzburg v. Hayes,232 the Supreme Court observed that “with-
out some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press
could be eviscerated.”233 The case of Feidin Santana illustrates234 that
newsgathering interests unabashedly are at stake when citizens play a
press-like function and record police performing their official duties.
Indeed, if news is defined as “the material that people use to learn
and think about the world beyond themselves,”235 then Santana defi-
nitely gathered news. As columnist Tony Norman of the Pittsburgh
Post-Gazette contends, Santana’s video “opened the eyes of millions
of Americans who previously doubted that a police officer would be
capable of shooting anyone who didn’t truly deserve it. It takes away
their certainty (until the next unrecorded shooting) that it is always
228. Daniel J. Solove, Reconstructing Electronic Surveillance Law, 72 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1264, 1302 (2004).
229. Hadar Aviram & Daniel L. Portman, Inequitable Enforcement: Introducing the
Concept of Equity into Constitutional Review of Law Enforcement, 61 HASTINGS L.J.
413, 423 (2009).
230. Id. at 447.
231. Bernard E. Harcourt & Tracey L. Meares, Randomization and the Fourth
Amendment, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 809, 811 (2011).
232. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
233. Id. at 681.
234. See supra notes 1–15 and accompanying text.
235. BILL KOVACH & TOM ROSENSTIEL, THE ELEMENTS OF JOURNALISM 37–38
(2001).
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the victim’s fault.”236 Parsed differently, citizen-recorded videos of po-
lice can serve as startling wake-up calls to an undesirable reality—a
first step toward discovering the truth about the ways and means of
policing among, perhaps, a few rogue officers.
Capturing images itself is a First Amendment-protected activity. As
Texas’s highest criminal court crisply reasoned in 2014:
The camera is essentially the photographer’s pen or paintbrush.
Using a camera to create a photograph or video is like applying pen
to paper to create a writing or applying brush to canvas to create a
painting. In all of these situations, the process of creating the end
product cannot reasonably be separated from the end product for
First Amendment purposes.237
In journalistic terms, as Professor Marc Jonathan Blitz observed in
2013, “using an iPhone to snap a photograph of one’s surroundings is,
in many respects, simply a modern form of note taking.”238 Those
iPhone notes, as it were, can expose police abuses of authority. The
Supreme Court, in turn, recognizes the role of the press “as a watch-
dog of government activity.”239 As the late First Amendment scholar
C. Edwin Baker wrote, “the press receives constitutional protection to
be a voice independent of the government (or, at least, independent of
the other three ‘estates’) in order to perform the crucial democratic
tasks of providing an independent source of vision and information,
including performance of a watchdog role.”240
Today, citizen-journalists wielding smartphones may perform this
same watchdog function. This is increasingly important because, as
Professor Seth Kreimer asserts, “[s]erendipitous amateur image cap-
ture can fill some of the lacunae left by the decimation of salaried
news staffs.”241 Indeed, a September 2010 article in American Journal-
ism Review contended that:
investigative reporters are a vanishing species in the forests of dead
tree media and missing in action on Action News. I-Teams are
shrinking or, more often, disappearing altogether. Assigned to cover
multiple beats, multitasking backpacking reporters no longer have
time to sniff out hidden stories, much less write them. In Washing-
236. Tony Norman, Video for Once Allows Police No Excuses, PITTSBURGH POST-
GAZETTE, Apr. 10, 2015, at A-2.
237. Ex parte Thompson, 442 S.W.3d 325, 337 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).
238. Marc Jonathan Blitz, The Fourth Amendment Future of Public Surveillance:
Remote Recording and Other Searches in Public Space, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 21, 76
(2013).
239. Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 447 (1991).
240. C. Edwin Baker, The Independent Significance of the Press Clause Under Ex-
isting Law, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 955, 968 (2007).
241. Seth F. Kreimer, Pervasive Image Capture and the First Amendment: Memory,
Discourse, and the Right to Record, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 335, 350 (2011).
164 TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3
ton, bureaus that once did probes have shrunk, closed and
consolidated.242
In a 2010 article, Professor Stephen Lacy and his colleagues noted
that “some academics and industry analysts have suggested that online
citizen journalism might evolve and develop to the point of compen-
sating for declining community coverage resulting from decreased
newspaper reporting resources.”243 A year earlier, Professor Claire
Serant witnessed “a growing trend that has citizen journalists working
with non-profit organizations to become frontline communicators in
towns that lost newspapers recently.”244 The bottom line is that citi-
zen-journalists, in light of economic factors plaguing the institutional
press and professional journalism today, are increasingly called upon
to play the role of watchdog.
Efforts, in turn, to distinguish citizen-journalists from the institu-
tional press are constitutionally flawed in this particular arena. Profes-
sor William Lee keenly observes that “[b]ecause the value of
expression does not depend upon the identity of its source, efforts to
separate the citizen journalists from the press are constitutionally
flawed. Stated differently, the constitutional value and protection of
expression does not depend upon whether it emanates from an institu-
tion recognized as the press.”245 In a similar vein, Professor Erik
Ugland called on the Supreme Court in 2008 to “abandon any sugges-
tion that ‘freedom of the press’ implies anything other than the free-
dom of all citizens to seek out the news and to communicate it through
media.”246
Indeed, two years later the Supreme Court recognized in Citizens
United v. Federal Election Commission247 that “[w]ith the advent of
the Internet and the decline of print and broadcast media, moreover,
the line between the media and others who wish to comment on politi-
cal and social issues becomes far more blurred.”248 Justice Anthony
Kennedy wrote for the majority that “restrictions distinguishing
among different speakers”249 are prohibited by the First Amendment.
Furthermore, the Citizens United majority quoted favorably Justice
Antonin Scalia’s observation from an earlier case that the Court has
242. Mary Walton, Investigative Shortfall, AM. JOURNALISM REV. (Sept. 2010),
http://www.ajr.org/Article.asp?id=4904 [http://perma.cc/2MZF-SLTT].
243. Stephen Lacy et al., Citizen Journalism Web Sites Complement Newspapers, 31
NEWSPAPER RES. J. 34, 34–35 (2010).
244. Claire Serant, Citizen Journalists Starting Newspapers in Towns That Have
Lost Their Weeklies, GRASSROOTS EDITOR, Fall 2009, at 13, 13.
245. William E. Lee, Citizen-Critics, Citizen Journalists, and the Perils of Defining
the Press, 48 GA. L. REV. 757, 771 (2014) (footnote omitted).
246. Erik Ugland, Demarcating the Right to Gather News: A Sequential Interpreta-
tion of the First Amendment, 3 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 113, 189 (2008)
(emphasis added).
247. Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
248. Id. at 352.
249. Id. at 340.
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“consistently rejected the proposition that the institutional press has
any constitutional privilege beyond that of other speakers.”250
Building from this logic, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit in 2014 concluded in a defamation case involving a defendant-
blogger that:
[t]he protections of the First Amendment do not turn on whether
the defendant was a trained journalist, formally affiliated with tradi-
tional news entities, engaged in conflict-of-interest disclosure, went
beyond just assembling others’ writings, or tried to get both sides of
a story. As the Supreme Court has accurately warned, a First
Amendment distinction between the institutional press and other
speakers is unworkable . . . .251
Finally, as Senior U.S. District Court Judge James Carr pointed out
in the right-to-record case of Crawford v. Geiger,252 which was ad-
dressed earlier in this Article,253 “[t]he First Amendment protects not
just the right of the press to gather news—it affords that right to the
general public as well.”254 Carr emphasized that:
[t]echnology has put the ability to gather and disseminate news-
worthy information literally in the hands of anyone who has a cell
phone. With increasingly frequency, events of local, regional, na-
tional, and even international significance first and frequently most
vividly come to public attention because a bystander saw, recorded,
and, often as those events were underway, transmitted what was
happening.255
Ultimately, then, any argument that the watchdog role played by
citizen-journalists when they take images of police performing duties
should somehow be devalued in First Amendment jurisprudence, as
compared to the mainstream or institutional press, simply does not
hold water. Beyond the watchdog role played by citizens when they
record police in action, a more fundamental benefit of capturing such
images is the effort to determine the truth regarding what really tran-
spires during interactions between police officers and suspects/
detainees.
For instance, the truth about such encounters is often contested. A
police officer, such as Officer Slager in the North Charleston shooting,
may claim one version of events.256 The person he questions or ar-
rests, however, may assert a very different account of the same inter-
action. More troubling, as in North Charleston, a citizen may be killed
250. Id. at 352 (quoting Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S.
652, 691 (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
251. Obsidian Fin. Grp. v. Cox, 740 F.3d 1284, 1291 (9th Cir. 2014).
252. Crawford v. Geiger, 996 F. Supp. 2d 603 (N.D. Ohio 2014).
253. See supra notes 158–73 and accompanying text.
254. Crawford, 996 F. Supp. 2d at 614.
255. Id.
256. See supra notes 11–12 and accompanying text.
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by the officer and not even have the opportunity to provide his or her
version of the truth. Thus, protecting a third-party citizen’s right to
record police-citizen interactions can help to shed light on the truth
regarding what transpires.
Searching for the truth, of course, is at the core of First Amendment
values. As scholar and theorist Thomas Emerson wrote, “freedom of
expression is an essential process for advancing knowledge and dis-
covering truth.”257 Indeed, the marketplace of ideas theory, which
Professor Matthew Bunker succinctly describes as “one of the most
powerful images of free speech, both for legal thinkers and for layper-
sons,”258 pivots on the notion that free speech “contributes to the pro-
motion of truth.”259
The marketplace of ideas theory was initially incorporated into First
Amendment jurisprudence260 nearly a century ago in Abrams v.
United States.261 That is when Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. fa-
mously reasoned in dissent that:
the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—
that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself
accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only
ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. That at
any rate is the theory of our Constitution. It is an experiment, as all
life is an experiment.262
As Professor Robert Post encapsulates it, “in Abrams Holmes ex-
plicitly oriented his theory of the First Amendment toward the value
of truth.”263 The Supreme Court in Hustler Magazine v. Falwell264 reit-
erated decades later the importance of what it called “the truth-seek-
ing function of the marketplace of ideas.”265
Images, in turn, can be powerful in ferreting out the truth. Professor
Barbie Zelizer, for example, asserts that in journalism “the image’s
capacity to be seen as true and accurate has come to uphold journal-
ism’s broader role in accounting for the real world.”266 Similarly, Pro-
257. THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6 (1970).
258. MATTHEW D. BUNKER, CRITIQUING FREE SPEECH: FIRST AMENDMENT THE-
ORY AND THE CHALLENGE OF INTERDISCIPLINARITY 2 (2001).
259. Daniel J. Solove, The Virtues of Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy Protections
Against Disclosure, 53 DUKE L.J. 967, 998 (2003).
260. See Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984
DUKE L.J. 1, 3 (asserting that Holmes first introduced the marketplace of ideas “con-
cept into American jurisprudence in his 1919 dissent to Abrams v. United States”).
261. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
262. Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
263. Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurispru-
dence, in ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA 153, 158 (Lee C.
Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 2002).
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fessor Peter Hamilton observes that journalistic photos are “assumed
to have some ‘truth-value’ in the sense that they allow the viewer priv-
ileged insight into the events they depict.”267 This is relevant here as
citizens, armed with smartphones, may play the role of journalists
when they record images of police interacting in public spaces with
other citizens. Ultimately, and in accord with Chief Justice John Rob-
erts’ point in 2012, “[a]s every schoolchild knows, a picture is worth a
thousand words.”268
Indeed, it is particularly useful to recall here how George Holliday’s
video, taken from his apartment balcony more than two decades ago,
“purported to capture the truth or reality of the beating, a reality sub-
ject to interpretation,”269 of African American Rodney King by sev-
eral Los Angeles police officers. As columnist Jan Ransom of the
Philadelphia Daily News astutely queries, “had it not been for the in-
famous video shot by George Holliday . . . would anyone have be-
lieved King’s story?”270 In the case of Rodney King, as perhaps today
the shooting of Walter Scott in North Charleston, “the camera be-
comes perfect witness and transparent medium, empowering those
who were not at the crime scene to become witnesses too.”271
In summary, because of the unambiguous importance of the First
Amendment and criminal justice interests involved in the recording
and dissemination of videos such as that captured by Feidin Santana,
the reasonable-restrictions standard adopted by courts for squelching
the right to record simply is insufficient to safeguard the watchdog and
truth-seeking functions performed today by citizen-journalists. A pos-
sible precedential hurdle, however, standing in the way of ramping up
the reasonableness test to a more stringent one in the name of First
Amendment interests is the Supreme Court’s 1978 decision in Zurcher
v. Stanford Daily.272
In Zurcher, the Court rejected the free-press argument that inno-
cent third-party searches of news organizations conducted under
Fourth Amendment strictures required special consideration of the
First Amendment interests at stake. As Justice Byron White wrote for
the Zurcher Court:
[P]rior cases do no more than insist that the courts apply the war-
rant requirements with particular exactitude when First Amend-
267. Peter Hamilton, Representing the Social: France and Frenchness in Post-War
Humanist Photography, in REPRESENTATION: CULTURAL REPRESENTATIONS AND
SIGNIFYING PRACTICES 75, 85 (Stuart Hall ed., 1997).
268. FCC v. CBS Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2677, 2678 (2012).
269. CLAY CALVERT, VOYEUR NATION: MEDIA, PRIVACY, AND PEERING IN MOD-
ERN CULTURE 5 (2000).
270. Jan Ransom, Around the Country, Power of Video v. Power of Police, PHILA.
DAILY NEWS, Sept. 3, 2011, at 6.
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Camera, from The Octoroon to Rodney King, 45 THEATRE J. 333, 347 (1993).
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ment interests would be endangered by the search. As we see it, no
more than this is required where the warrant requested is for the
seizure of criminal evidence reasonably believed to be on the prem-
ises occupied by a newspaper.273
Justice White added that “[t]here is no reason to believe . . . that mag-
istrates cannot guard against searches of the type, scope, and intru-
siveness that would actually interfere with the timely publication of a
newspaper.”274
A key difference, however, between Zurcher and the right-to-re-
cord cases at the heart of this Article is the involvement, prior to any
law enforcement action, of a neutral judge or magistrate in the former,
but not in the latter. To this point, Justice White reasoned in Zurcher
that “[t]he hazards of such warrants can be avoided by a neutral mag-
istrate carrying out his responsibilities under the Fourth Amendment,
for he has ample tools at his disposal to confine warrants to search
within reasonable limits.”275 In other words, a judge or magistrate
stands as an intermediary between police and newsroom searches, at-
tempting to cabin and confine the search scope of law enforcement
personnel in advance of a search.
In the right-to-record cases, however, no judge or magistrate is con-
sulted in advance of a police officer’s on-duty decision to halt a citi-
zen’s filming of his or her actions. As Magistrate Mark Lane wrote in
2015, “the officer on the scene of an arrest or investigation will be the
arbiter of what constitutes a reasonable time, place, and manner for
the exercise of the individual’s First Amendment right to record.”276
The officer thus acts free of interference by a judge or magistrate. It is
only after the officer thwarts a citizen’s recording that a judge or mag-
istrate steps into the picture to determine, post hoc, if the quashing of
recording was reasonable.
If, in turn, the judge or magistrate decides that stopping the filming
was unreasonable, then there is no suitable remedy for the infringed
upon First Amendment interests. That is because the recording was
stopped, either before it could begin or before it was allowed to finish.
This is tantamount to a prior restraint on protected expression, caus-
ing irreparable injury to the First Amendment and to the public’s right
to know. As the Supreme Court has observed, “[t]he loss of First
Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestion-
ably constitutes irreparable injury.”277 Just as restrictions on exit pol-
ling in public places prevent gathering information from voters and
273. Id. at 565.
274. Id. at 566.
275. Id. at 567.
276. Buehler v. City of Austin, A-13-CV-1100-ML, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20878, at
*24 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 20, 2015).
277. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976).
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thereby cause irreparable injury to First Amendment interests,278 so
too do restrictions on filming police in public venues.
Whatever images might have been captured on video, had not an
officer stopped it, can never be recaptured. They are gone forever.
That is highly problematic because, as investigative reporter Thomas
Peele asserts, “the best chance here of learning about police abuse is
for it to be captured live.”279
A second major difference between Zurcher and the right-to-record
cases is that the Zurcher Court considered the alleged danger to First
Amendment interests to be purely speculative. In contrast, the multi-
ple examples of apparent abuse in the right-to-record disputes de-
scribed in the Introduction280 suggest the harms are very real.
Remarking on the unproven and abstract nature of the harm to the
press in Zurcher, Justice White wrote that the Stanford Daily and its
supporting friends of the court:
pointed to only a very few instances in the entire United States
since 1971 involving the issuance of warrants for searching newspa-
per premises. This reality hardly suggests abuse; and if abuse occurs,
there will be time enough to deal with it. Furthermore, the press is
not only an important, critical, and valuable asset to society, but it is
not easily intimidated—nor should it be.281
Two facets of this logic do not hold up when applied to the right-to-
record cases. First, examples of police abuse of power in right-to-re-
cord cases are numerous, as the instances from April 2015 alone that
are described in the Introduction indicate.282 And the troubles keep
on coming: in May 2015, a Tempe, Arizona police officer was sus-
pended “for seizing cellphones from a man who was recording an en-
counter with the officer.”283
Second, Justice White’s assumption in Zurcher that the press “is not
easily intimidated”284 was directed at the institutional press, not aver-
age citizens who now use smartphones to capture news. One can eas-
ily imagine citizens being deterred from recording police if not
assured of First Amendment protection. Although mainstream news
organizations may have money and insurance to fight legal disputes in
278. ABC v. Heller, 2:06-CV-01268-PMP-RJJ, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80030, at
*38–39 (D. Nev. Nov. 1, 2006).
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lice-action-is-often-only [http://perma.cc/U7F6-UERX].
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283. Associated Press, Tempe Officer Suspended for Seizing Man’s Cellphones, AL-
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court, the average citizen likely lacks that same financial power and
might, in turn, censor his or her recording activities in order not to risk
arrest at the hands of officers upset they are being recorded.
Ultimately, then, the First Amendment interests at stake in right-to-
record police cases demand that any restrictions imposed on the right
be subject to a much more stringent standard of judicial review than
mere reasonableness. The next Part thus argues that the appropriate
standard of review tracks that of strict scrutiny and, in particular, that
any restriction on the right to record must be so narrowly tailored as
to be necessary to serve a compelling law enforcement interest.
IV. TOWARD A STRICT SCRUTINY STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR
CENSORING THE RIGHT TO RECORD POLICE IN PUBLIC
VENUES: FROM REASONABLE RESTRICTIONS TO
NECESSARY RESTRICTIONS AND THE
CREATION OF A CONTINUUM OF NECESSITY
A fundamental dichotomy in First Amendment speech jurispru-
dence separates content-based restrictions from content-neutral regu-
lations.285 The former typically are subject to the rigorous strict
scrutiny standard of judicial review, while the latter are analyzed
under a more lenient and government-friendly intermediate scrutiny
test.286
Under strict scrutiny, a restriction on speech will be upheld only if it
“is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest.”287 The Supreme
Court observed in 2011 that this “is a demanding standard.”288 That is
partly because the concept of narrow tailoring in strict scrutiny de-
mands that the restriction on speech “be the least restrictive
means”289 of serving the alleged compelling interest. This necessitates
that “[i]f a less restrictive alternative would serve the Government’s
purpose, the legislature must use that alternative.”290
In contrast, under intermediate scrutiny the means “need not be the
least restrictive or least intrusive means.”291 Instead, and in accord
with the Fourth Amendment analysis described above in Section D of
285. Clay Calvert, Content-Based Confusion and Panhandling: Muddling a Weath-
ered First Amendment Doctrine Takes Its Toll on Society’s Less Fortunate, 18 RICH-
MOND J. L. & PUB. INT. 249, 250 (2015).
286. Id. at 250–51; see also Patrick M. Garry, A New First Amendment Model for
Evaluating Content-Based Regulation of Internet Pornography: Revising the Strict
Scrutiny Model to Better Reflect the Realities of the Modern Media Age, 2007 BYU L.
REV. 1595, 1600–01 (observing that “in order to sustain various speech restrictions
under a more permissive review than strict scrutiny, an intermediate level of scrutiny
has been used for time, place, and manner regulations found to be content-neutral”).
287. Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1665 (2015).
288. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011).
289. McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2530 (2014).
290. United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000).
291. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989).
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Part II, “reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of en-
gaging in protected speech”292 are allowed. Additionally, the interest
needed to support a speech restriction under intermediate scrutiny
need only be significant or important, rather than compelling.293
The Supreme Court has observed that “[d]eciding whether a partic-
ular regulation is content based or content neutral is not always a sim-
ple task.”294 Despite this fact, several strong arguments exist that
restrictions on the First Amendment right to record police in public
places are content based and, thus, should be subject to strict scrutiny
review.
First, the scope of the right to record police itself applies only to a
particular type of content—namely, images and recordings depicting
government officials and, specifically, police performing their official
duties in public venues. If content-based restrictions are those that re-
quire examination of the content of a message to know if a violation
occurs,295 then this right can only be violated if the images in question
are those of specific people (law enforcement personnel) doing spe-
cific tasks (carrying out their jobs). For a violation to occur, then, a
judge needs to examine the censored images to see if law enforcement
personnel are portrayed in them or, if the recording was thwarted
before it could even begin, needs to examine the testimony of the citi-
zen-recorder to determine what she was attempting to record.
Second, such restrictions are content based because they are “con-
cerned with undesirable effects that arise from ‘the direct impact of
speech on its audience’ or ‘[l]isteners’ reactions to speech.’”296 Specifi-
cally, police officers are concerned about the direct impact—the unde-
sirable effects, as it were—of citizens’ cameras pointed toward them
when they squelch those citizens’ right to record them. It is the reac-
tion of the officers to the act of recording that directly leads to censor-
ship. Police fear the speech-recording process will somehow negatively
impact either their actions or those of the suspects/detainees.
In summary, only a very particular, specific type of content or sub-
ject matter is being censored—images of police in action—in cases
like Glik.297 Put differently, Simon Glik’s recording in Boston Com-
mon would not have been censored by police had the subject matter
292. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 428 (1993) (em-
phasis added).
293. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 189 (1997) (asserting that
“[a] content-neutral regulation will be sustained under the First Amendment if it ad-
vances important governmental interests unrelated to the suppression of free speech
and does not burden substantially more speech than necessary to further those inter-
ests”); Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 791 (noting that there must be “a significant
governmental interest” under intermediate scrutiny).
294. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994).
295. McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2531 (2014).
296. Id. at 2531–32 (alteration in original) (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321
(1988)).
297. See supra notes 182–89 and accompanying text.
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of his cellphone images been tourists strolling through the park, a
couple holding hands, or people frolicking on a summer day in the
Frog Pond Spray Pool.298 Glik was in a public space and could shoot
any of those images without fear of arrest. It was only because the
images were of police in action that he was arrested.
Because of the content-based nature of restrictions imposed on
photographing police in public places, those restrictions should be re-
quired to comport with strict scrutiny review. Specifically, they must
be justified by a compelling interest and be narrowly tailored in scope
such that they cannot be served as effectively by “a less restrictive
alternative.”299 In other words, a restriction must be more than just
reasonable to serve the compelling interest; it must, in fact, be “care-
fully tailored”300 as “the least restrictive means”301 of serving it.
It boils down to requiring a much tighter fit between law enforce-
ment interests and the restrictions ostensibly designed to serve them.
This is important because it requires police to more carefully and pre-
cisely craft restrictions on citizen-recorders than are permitted under
the more relaxed standard of reasonableness. In blunt terms, citizen-
recorders can only be made to stand back from police no more than is
absolutely necessary to serve compelling law enforcement interests.
Assuming that the collective safety of officers, suspects/detainees,
and the public, as well as preserving evidence at public crime and acci-
dent scenes, are compelling interests when police interact with people
on the job, the focus necessarily becomes whether a restriction on the
right to film in any given case is truly necessary to serve any of those
interests. The danger here, of course, is that the difference between a
reasonable restriction and a necessary restriction becomes little more
than meaningless semantics and a futile exercise in verbal gymnastics.
To add rigor and consistency to the reasonable-versus-necessary dif-
ference, there must be standardized criteria and variables for both po-
lice and courts to consider and evaluate in any given citizen-recorder
case. What follows, then, are some possibilities to begin the process of
adding legal flesh to this difference. They hopefully will spark a con-
versation—one among stakeholders, including First Amendment ad-
vocates, law enforcement leaders, members of the judiciary, and
concerned citizens—about factors to be weighed, in a totality-of-the-
circumstances approach, by courts to decide if a restriction truly was
the least restrictive possible on the First Amendment right to record.
298. See Warm Weather Programs, BOS. COMMON FROG POND, http://boston-
frogpond.com/warm-weather-programs [http://perma.cc/QXR5-WRDN] (noting that
“[t]he Frog Pond Spray Pool is a Boston family favorite for city dwellers and visitors
alike. Sit back, relax, and enjoy the beauty and history of The Boston Common while
your little tadpoles splash around and cool down on hot summer days”).
299. United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000).
300. Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989).
301. Id.
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The approach proposed below involves a continuum, dubbed here a
Continuum of Necessity. On one end (the unconstitutional end) are
police remedies—citizen arrest, camera seizure, and camera destruc-
tion—that invariably are overly repressive of First Amendment inter-
ests and thus are unconstitutional as applied to citizens who do no
more than record police in public places. Arrest, seizure, and destruc-
tion are the least narrowly tailored of possible restrictions on the First
Amendment right to record, as described below in Section A.
On the opposite end of the continuum (the presumptively constitu-
tional end) are police orders for citizens to stand no more than five
yards back from police-suspect/detainee encounters. This fifteen-foot
buffer zone, as described below in Section B, strikes a balance be-
tween safety concerns and First Amendment interests. A citizen-re-
corder who claims that an order to stand five or fewer yards back
would need to demonstrate why such distances are excessive under
the factual circumstances.
In between these extremes are orders for citizen-recorders to stand
more than five yards back. In all such cases, police must demonstrate
why the order is the least restrictive possible—impinging absolutely
no more than is necessary on First Amendment interests—to serve
compelling safety interests and/or preservation of evidence/crime
scene values. In these more-than-five-yards scenarios, as described
later in Section C, courts should consider a list of factors to help de-
cide the necessity of the restriction.
Continuum of Necessity
Unconstitutional
Arrest/
Seizure/
Destruction
Constitutional
5 or Fewer
Yards Back
More Than
5 Yards Back
A. Arrest, Camera Seizure, and Camera Destruction: The Least
Narrowly Tailored Restrictions
As a starting point, the least narrowly tailored restriction—the most
sweeping constraint that would never survive strict scrutiny—is to ar-
rest and/or seize or destroy the recording device of a citizen who,
while situated in a public place, is doing nothing more than recording
police on the job. Arrest and equipment seizure are extreme reac-
tions—ones tantamount to imposing a prior restraint on the produc-
tion of speech—to such potential news-gathering conduct and thus are
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presumptively unconstitutional.302 In brief, the mere act of recording
an officer performing duties in public should never, standing alone,
justify an arrest or camera seizure. There must be some conduct in
addition to the recording act to justify this drastic restriction. This
might be considered a recording-plus criterion.
An officer who arrests a citizen-recorder or who seizes her record-
ing device should be required to prove that the citizen-recorder’s
overall conduct—conduct in addition to the act of recording—was ei-
ther: (a) directly creating an imminent danger to the safety of the of-
ficer, suspect/detainee, and/or other members of the public located in
close physical proximity to the officer; or (b) interfering with the pres-
ervation of evidence at the scene of an accident or crime. Such addi-
tional conduct might include: (1) physically trying to obstruct the
officer in performing duties; (2) repeatedly trying to engage the officer
in disruptive conversation while the officer is talking with the suspect/
detainee and after being told by the officer to remain quiet;303 or (3)
verbally trying to incite others in the near vicinity to attack the of-
ficer.304 These are the only circumstances in which such extreme reme-
dies might be justified.
B. An Order to Stand Five or Fewer Yards Back: Presumptively
Narrowly Tailored & Least Restrictive
If the citizen-recorder is standing within the immediate physical
reach of an officer performing his or her duties, the remedy should be
one of distance to stand back, not one of arrest or camera seizure/
destruction. The concept of “immediate physical reach,” for sake of
consistency, is proposed here as standing within five yards of an of-
ficer who is interacting with a suspect/detainee or who is actively pre-
serving/collecting evidence. An immediate physical reach buffer zone
is necessary for officer safety, as well as the safety of the citizen-re-
corder, who might be injured if the officer-suspect/detainee interac-
tion turns violent.
302. See Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 556–59 (1976) (describing
how prior restraints are presumptively unconstitutional and carry “an immediate and
irreversible sanction”).
303. See Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972) (upholding a disorderly conduct
conviction of a man who repeatedly verbally interfered with police). As the Kentucky
appellate court in this case described it, the defendant “was not seeking to express a
thought to any listener or to disseminate any idea. He simply was trying to irritate the
police by his presence and by efforts at interruption.” Colten v. Kentucky, 467 S.W.2d
374, 378 (Ky. Ct. App. 1971), aff’d, 407 U.S. 104 (1972).
304. Incitement of imminent violence that is likely to occur is not protected by the
First Amendment. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (holding that
“the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to
forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such
advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to
incite or produce such action”).
2015] FILMING COPS 175
Of course, there will be quibbles by First Amendment purists over
whether an order to stand five yards back—fifteen feet—is too far
away and unnecessarily hinders the recording of clear images. For ex-
ample, a 2015 Texas bill that would have created a twenty-five-foot
buffer zone was later dropped after being severely criticized.305 But a
five-yard-back approach, with the clarity of today’s smartphone cam-
eras, is designed to strike a balance between First Amendment inter-
ests and law enforcement objectives, including safety concerns.
Compromise seems a matter of necessity if progress is to be made on
this issue.
An order to stand no more than five yards back thus would be pre-
sumptively narrowly tailored and no greater than necessary to protect
compelling interests in safety and evidence preservation. A citizen-
recorder challenging a five-yards-back order would need to demon-
strate how it interfered with his or her ability to record the officer in
action.
C. More Than Five Yards Back: Presumptively Unconstitutional
A police order for a citizen-recorder to stand more than five yards
back of a police-suspect/detainee encounter should be presumptively
unconstitutional. Such orders may be permitted and upheld by courts,
however, if police can demonstrate they are necessary to serve com-
pelling interests in safety or evidence/crime scene preservation.
The overarching principle here is simple: The further back the police
order to stand, the more difficult the police burden of proving its neces-
sity. In other words, there is a positive correlation—the greater the re-
striction, the greater the burden. This rule is the backbone of analysis
for all distance-based restrictions of more than five yards under the
framework proposed here as a starting point for discussion among
stakeholders.
Factors for courts to consider in the evaluation process of five-plus-
yards pushbacks include, but are not limited to:
(1) The number of police officers on the scene;
(2) The number of suspects/detainees on the scene;
(3) Whether the suspects/detainees are known to be armed and/or
whether there is probable cause to believe they are armed;
(4) The nature of the criminal record(s) of the suspect(s)/de-
tainee(s) known to the officers at the scene and at the time
when an order to push back a citizen-recorder more than five
yards was made;
(5) The lighting of the scene (daytime or nighttime, light or dark);
305. Allison Wisk, Bill to Limit Filming of Police Activity is Dropped, DALL.
MORNING NEWS (Apr. 10, 2015), http://www.dallasnews.com/news/politics/state-polit-
ics/20150410-bill-to-limit-filming-of-police-activity-is-dropped.ece [http://perma.cc/
27A7-G4NQ].
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(6) The potential public concern of any images and video that
might be captured at the scene, given the specific facts sur-
rounding the police encounter with suspects/detainees;306
(7) The number, if any, of clearly (based on their words and/or con-
duct) police-hostile members of the public located within the
immediate physical proximity (five or fewer yards) of the of-
ficer(s) at the scene; and
(8) Whether the citizen-recorder was, beyond the mere act of re-
cording, engaged in any police-hostile conduct such as yelling at
the police, encouraging others to attack the police, or physically
trying to disrupt the actions of the police.
These eight factors are to be weighed by courts, considering the pre-
cise distance of a police pushback order of more than five yards and in
light of the guiding rule that the further back the police’s order to
stand, the more difficult the police’s burden of proving it is necessary.
No one factor controls. Importantly, the sixth factor—the potential
public concern of any images that might have been (or that were) cap-
tured at the scene—directly takes into account First Amendment in-
terests into this judicial analysis.307
The bottom line is that the analysis proposed here is merely a start-
ing point to foster discussion and dialogue among academics and,
more importantly, stakeholders in right-to-record cases in which po-
lice restrictions were imposed on citizen-recorders. The factors, of
course, are ripe for commentary and suggestions by other scholars and
stakeholders.
V. CONCLUSION
In 2015, the First Amendment right of citizens to record police per-
forming their duties in public places is in an unsettled phase of judicial
ferment. Constitutional calm and stasis have yet to settle in over this
evolving, hot-button right; some courts recognize it, some courts do
306. The guiding principle on this factor is that the more potential for the public
concern of the images, the less distance of pushback should be afforded to the police.
This, in other words, is an inverse or negative relationship—the greater the images
may have public concern, the less is the distance allowed for their restriction.
The concept of “public concern” may be evaluated here under the test adopted by
the Supreme Court in Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011). In Snyder, the high
court held that speech regarding matters of public concern is privileged and at the
core of First Amendment protection. Id. at 1215. The Court broadly defined public
concern, disjunctively, as expression that might “be fairly considered as relating to
any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community” or that relates to
“a subject of legitimate news interest; that is, a subject of general interest and of value
and concern to the public.” Id. at 1216.
In defining public concern, the Snyder majority concentrated on a trio of vari-
ables—content, context, and form of the speech—and asserted that when evaluating
them, “no factor is dispositive, and it is necessary to evaluate all the circumstances of
the speech, including what was said, where it was said, and how it was said.” Id.
307. See supra Part III.
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not, and those that do, qualify it with a slippery reasonable-restric-
tions standard.
This Article illustrated that the most recent federal appellate court
to consider the issue—the First Circuit, with its 2014 opinion in Ger-
icke v. Begin—solidly recognized the existence of such a right, even
when the incident recorded is a traffic stop.308 On the other hand, dis-
trict courts within other federal circuits fractured in 2015 on whether
there is a consensus of appellate authority recognizing such a right or,
instead, a split of authority.309
Significantly, a federal judge within the influential Southern District
of New York, which includes New York City, acknowledged in May
2015 the existence of this right. That decision, in Higginbotham v. City
of New York, paves the way for the Second Circuit to perhaps soon
become the fifth federal circuit—along with the First, Seventh, Ninth,
and Eleventh—to recognize a First Amendment right to record police
performing their duties in public venues. Other federal circuits that
have not squarely addressed the existence of such a First Amendment
right might, in the meantime, offer their views in future cases.
As smartphone ownership now approaches nearly two-thirds of all
American adults,310 it seemingly increases the odds that cases will pro-
liferate and percolate up through the judicial system in the near fu-
ture. In fact, a 2014 study by Nielson found that among Millennials,
which account for about 77 million people in the United States, 85%
ranging in ages from eighteen through twenty-four years own
smartphones, and 86% spanning ages twenty-five to thirty-four years
own them.311
More troubling than the current split of authority, this Article ar-
gued, is the relaxed standard of reasonableness for restrictions that
may be permissibly imposed on this nascent First Amendment right.
A reasonable-restrictions standard, stemming from Fourth Amend-
ment dictates, simply provides too much discretion and wiggle room
for police to squelch First Amendment interests, including the
unenumerated public’s right to know about potential abuses of police
power. The Article asserts that any restrictions on this emerging con-
stitutional right, which can help lead directly to discovery of the truth
308. See supra notes 176–81 and accompanying text (addressing Gericke).
309. See supra Part II, Section B, Subsection 1 (addressing two seemingly diametri-
cally opposed views on this issue by two different federal district courts in 2015).
310. See Aaron Smith, U.S. Smartphone Use in 2015, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 1, 2015),
http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/04/01/us-smartphone-use-in-2015 [http://perma.cc/
69LB-FKE2] (finding that “64% of American adults now own a smartphone of some
kind, up from 35% in the spring of 2011. Smartphone ownership is especially high
among younger Americans, as well as those with relatively high income and education
levels”).
311. Mobile Millennials: Over 85% of Generation Y Owns Smartphones, NIELSON
(Sept. 5, 2014), http://www.nielsen.com/us/en/insights/news/2014/mobile-millennials-
over-85-percent-of-generation-y-owns-smartphones.html [http://perma.cc/977R-
MH79].
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about police interactions with suspects/detainees, should be subject to
judicial review akin to strict scrutiny.
Specifically, limitations imposed on the right must be narrowly tai-
lored with such precision and tight fit that no other alternatives were
available that could have allowed for enhanced citizen recording
rights. The Article has offered up, as a starting point for collaborative
discussion among First Amendment advocates and law enforcement
leaders, as well as members of the judiciary, eight factors to lend rigor
to determinations of whether restrictions are, in fact, narrowly tai-
lored. The Article also proposed a Continuum of Necessity for evalu-
ating such cases, as well as a fundamental principle—namely, the
greater the distance pushback by police, the greater the police burden
to justify it—at the heart of this analysis.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court must, posthaste, wade into the
thicket to make clear two principles: (1) there is a clearly established
First Amendment right to record police in 2015 performing their offi-
cial duties in public places; and (2) any restrictions imposed on this
constitutional right are only permissible if they are so narrowly tai-
lored and carefully crafted that there are no other possible alterna-
tives that would allow for greater ability of citizens and journalists to
record police under the circumstances. The nation’s high court should
also establish clear factors and criteria for lower courts to deploy
when fathoming whether any given police-imposed restriction was, in
fact, no greater than necessary to serve compelling interests in safety
(officer, suspect/detainee, or public) and evidence preservation.
Without judicial adoption of such criteria, the critical difference be-
tween reasonable restrictions and necessary restrictions surely risks
becoming muddled and meaningless. And without leadership from the
Supreme Court now, the split of authority that some courts currently
recognize will allow rogue police officers to continue to escape, under
the doctrine of qualified immunity, monetary liability when they
wrongfully seize phones and arrest citizens for doing no more than
recording public servants in the line of duty.
